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ABSTRACT
This project aims to examine the causes for the recent ascent of populism
in the West during the last dozen or so years with a lens focused on the United
States and France. The primary area under observation is both the historical and
contemporary role that populism and its adherents have played within our
cultures. I aim to address the following: What is populism, how has it been
broadly understood and how do its adherents regard it and what causes populist
movements to develop. Academics in the field have produced a rich
historiography that reveals a divided discourse. Previously analysts have
debated over foundational definitions, the broad tenets, its connections to
existing ideologies and various other topics. The subject is of importance
because populism plays a highly consequential role in modern political systems
which seems unlikely to dissipate soon. My aim in this is to re-examine the
historical role of populism and clarify if its presence reveals any inconvenient
truths about our contemporary political systems. The analysis uses primarily a
social and economic examination with an occasional cultural glance to keep it
appropriately grounded to the topic. The document produces a series of sources
ranging from cartoons, statistics, polling, film, songs, speeches and other matters
to hopefully provide a comprehensive examination that leaves few stones
unturned. My conclusion draws that populism is an inevitable result of the
inequities produced by the historical liberal capitalist modes of economy and
politics that it was formed in. They reveal that populism is an inescapable
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component of modern democracy that affects the language and habits of even its
opponents who humor it due to its essential efficacy. The dominant significance
of this is to not consider populism merely a fringe inconvenience but rather fully
regard it as perhaps the primary competing mode of political action both now and
for the presentable future as its driving components only become starker if
exceptional action is not taken.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Populism’s Roles and Shapes
Populism within the last decade has become a go to expression either for
condemnation or approval for various movements across the political spectrum
and those that seem to defy it at times. It has come to represent movements
ranging from socialist adjacent economic rebellions to an array of right wing
ethno-nationalist movements across the globe along with other movements that
have proven more difficult to place. It has been used both sincerely in its
applications while also often being co-opted for other purposes by the cynical. In
a world largely dominated by neo-liberalism since the 1970s, it represents the
nebulous territory of the varied forms of resistance and outrage to its ongoing
hegemony though in some cases not necessarily for the better. Populism in this
way is effectively a shibboleth that means whatever it needs to mean in laymen
contexts but this does not mean that it has no essential elements that we might
ascribe to it. It exists not merely as a dubious political ideology but also as a form
of strategy, an aesthetic, a manner of appeal and most importantly as distinctly a
form of reaction that represents a crisis of confidence in societal institutions.
While populism has had an extensive history throughout much of the world, I
intend to examine it through an American and French lense in order to both
narrow the scope of analysis while also allowing me to hone in on some of the
larger currents that have swept between these two historically connected nations.
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We can distinguish how both the language and rhetoric of populism permeated
much of the founding documents and sentiments of both nations as we presently
understand them for the past two hundred plus years or so that has led to
continually repeating cycles of rise and decline of such notions within them that
we still find as of this writing.
Overview of Populism in America and France
The pre-independence roots of populism within the United States go
throughout the 18th century as men such as Thomas Paine first invoked the
challenge against the alleged supremacy of ‘the elite’ that was argued for by
earlier philosophers and the systems that preceded capitalism that we currently
broadly describe as feudalism. Going into the 19th century we can find its
presence within the presidency of Andrew Jackson who would demonstrate the
common hypocrisies and limitations of some aspects of populist thought from a
position of leadership as the nation would discover who ‘the people’ were in his
eyes. Further into the century we encounter a more grassroots form of populism
in the form of the Know Nothings and People’s Party of the United States
respectively as we run into some of the dissonances and difficulties that come
from attempting to place populism within the strict boundaries of left to right
political constructs that we have today. This was only expanded upon as the
country moved into the Progressive Era and the 20th century where it would
encounter politicians such as presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan,
Teddy Roosevelt and eventually Louisiana governor Huey Long. We would see
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the rise of some of the biggest populist figures in American history that arose in
an era where few could dispute the inequities between the common man and the
privileged of the nation. A new measure of populism would arise with the dawn of
the Cold War as a new enemy of ‘the people’ was discovered both domestically
and abroad. Figures such as Douglas McArthur rose to become the new symbols
of strong leadership among those with a reactionary bent as the ever present
conspiratorial nature of populism became more prevalent. This would be
continued as the white nationalist form of populism that has existed throughout
the nation's history would arise again through the Civil Rights era as various
political figures like George Wallace preyed upon the prejudices of white racists
in order to secure political careers. Further it is critical that we examine the ways
in which films and other forms of media made within the United States reveal
some of the fundamental populist themes that exist within the currents of
American life. Movies such as Mr Smith Goes to Washington, It’s a Wonderful
Life and Network demonstrate the ways in which media shape and are shaped
by populism. Finally, it would return again in the previous decade with the
formation of the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street Movements which again
show the distinct contrasts as portions of society reacted to both the first Black
president and the economic crash of 2008 respectively. This populist rhetoric
would culminate at the highest ends of power as both Vermont Senator Bernie
Sanders and former President Donald Trump would both make strong appeals to
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‘the people’ though in utterly disparate ways thus demonstrating the difficulties in
attempting to simplify matters.
On the French end of this consideration it is necessary to contrast the
ways in which populism seemed to have arisen in comparison to the United
States. The factor of some of its origins not arising from a foriegn enemy such as
the British Empire but an internal one in the form of the monarchy ruled by Louis
XVI which was further supported by the aristocracy and the church. The ways in
which it drove both the highs and lows of the French Revolution where ‘the
people’ were elevated to nigh deific status before the consolidation of power
under Robespierre and then Napoleon in the wars to follow. The embers of its
return during the Revolutions of 1848 that saw much of Europe attempting to
overthrow the hierarchies of the old world with what we might call a mixed result
that would inspire greater developments in the future. It would see the creation of
a new reactionary populism within France after the loss of the Franco-Prussian
War which resulted in both the loss of Alsace-Lorraine along with the rise of
Georges Ernest Boulanger and the Revanchists he inspired. In the 1890’s the will
of ‘the people’ would be split by the controversy of the century in the form of the
Dreyfus Affair which would call into question the foundations of French society
and who was a loyal citizen. During the Post-War period after the German
Occupation, it would see other movements arise based around figures such as
Charles De Gaulle and Pierre Poujade that demonstrated that while France was
reunified that it was not necessarily at consensus either as France attempted to
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reckon with itself. Finally, we arrive to the near present with the arrival of the
Yellow Vest movement that has gathered supporters from all over the political
spectrum from the socialist supporters of Jean-Luc Melenchon to the fascistic
followers of Marine Le-pen. Rather than extensively covering these movements
in detail, it is the intention of this analysis to present them when relevant to the
discussion of broader ideas when necessary in order to demonstrate the
foundations of populism and its rising grasp upon the present..
Populism As An Understood Phenomena
Instead of acting as an occasional insurgent party or movement with
limited successes that often occurs elsewhere, populism in the United States has
been functionally present from the before inception of the nation. It has colored
the way that even those ostensibly opposed to populism speak when they
address audiences. Indeed, mainstream American politicians and parties have
balanced between railing against populism versus courting it as it goes through
the traditional ebbs and flows of American political relevance throughout the
decades. This has been furthered by the ways in which populism is not always
an entirely grass roots affair as we might commonly imagine. Throughout the
annals of populist history we can find the ways in which it has been co-opted or
even created wholecloth via astroturfing to create the illusion of mass popular
support for various movements that are ultimately disproportionate to their actual
popularity with the motives of involved becoming scrambled. These
contradictions found within some of the strands of populism are represented
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across the Western landscape in various forms as they battle with the present
and past of the nation in determining what is the desired nature of democracy.
What I intend to demonstrate with this is that populism, for good or for ill, is a
bug of the modern democratic system with its roots deep into the psyche of
democracies even in ways that are not even always consciously expressed. This
is important to distinguish given the hope for a ‘return to normalcy’ which is
understandable but also a fanciful goal that has become popular within parts of
the national dialogue.1 Populism is the varied popular reaction against the
dissonance created by the illiberal nature of contemporary democratic
institutions. Its rise is not coincidence but rather a continuous expression of
dissatisfaction amongst parts of the populace based on the contradictions
between the imagined democracies and the real ones that we have always
inhabited. The existence of populism stands as both a critique of liberal
democracy while also ironically contradicting some of the larger ideas of orthodox
Marxism. Marx contended that such liberal capitalist democracies would
eventually fold under the weight of their own contradictions which would create
what he referred to as class consciousness. More often what populism has
shown us is that while such developments do sometimes occur that response to
this dissonance goes beyond lines of class into other collective social signifiers
that people build identities around. Furthermore, these are complicated by the
1

. Ezra Klein, “Joe Biden's Promise: A Return to Normalcy,” Vox (Vox, May 20,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/20/18631452/joe-biden-2020-pre
sidential-announcement-speech.
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social divisions that produce movements built more on the whims of the petite
bourgeoisie or ‘middle class’ as we might imagine. These perceived
contradictions are not necessarily shared amongst all segments within the larger
populace but do seem to be readily increasing which can be demonstrated with
polling from Monmouth University that presents the following.2
Would you say things in the country are going in the right direction, or
have they gotten off on the wrong track?

TREND:

Jan. Dec. Nov.
2022 2021 202
1

Sept July June April Marc
.
2021 2021 2021 h
2021
2021

Jan.
2021

Right direction

24%

30%

31% 29%

38%

37%

46%

34%

42%

Wrong track

71%

66%

64% 65%

56%

57%

50%

61%

51%

(VOL) Depends

3%

1%

2%

4%

3%

3%

2%

4%

3%

(VOL) Don’t
know

2%

3%

3%

2%

4%

3%

2%

2%

4%

(n)

(794
)

(808
)

(811
)
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)
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)
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)

(800
)

(802)

(809
)

Figure 1. Opinions On The Direction Of The Country

This poll of course could not account for any universal sentiments that
those polled would believe would put the country on the right track but

2

. “GOP Has Congress Edge by Default,” Monmouth University Polling Institute,
January 26, 2022,
https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_US_012622/.
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nevertheless there seems to be mass discontent with present political structures.
Another question that we must confront is why is populism viewed as a
necessary response for so much of the populace if we exist within allegedly
democratic systems, are ‘the people’ already not in power if that is the case? A
2014 study which in retrospect seems quite prescient declared that the United
States was not truly a democracy but in fact an oligarchy due to the
overwhelming influence that wealthy private entities have upon its political
systems.3 Regardless of the virtue of populism it is necessary to take seriously
that it is based on to some extent legitimate reactions to disenfranchisement that
is the result of the ailing systems that pave the way for autocracy and the
appearance of easy solutions to difficult problems.
If we look closely we can find that populism has been attached to nearly
every sort of subjective virtue or vice that we can imagine in politics at one point
or another. This includes topics relating to race, class, gender, nationalism,
international relations, religion, and others with opinions varying wildly in ways
that are not traditionally thought of when the term populism arises. It would also
be inappropriate to consider and examine populism as a political styling of just
frustrated white men when the truth is that historically women and people of color
have had crucial and sometimes leading roles in populist movements throughout
history as they are affected by issues both general and specific to them. This is
3

. Martin, Gilens, and Benjamin I. Page. “Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3
(2014): 564–81. doi:10.1017/S1537592714001595.
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not to say necessarily though that broader populists movements have not been
complicated spaces for those who are not considered the primary part of the
allegedly majoritarian entity that is ‘the people’ whenever such movements arise
with many of them often finding themselves marginalized within these spaces.
What is also crucial to examine is the ways in which academics and mass
media have intertwined with populism either as an ardent critic or as a supporter
at times. While most forms of populism have had relatively few advocates within
these spaces within any period of time for various reasons including the often
anti-intellectual nature of populism, There remain notable exceptions. While
populism may sometimes seem utterly spontaneous at times, it by no means
appears without warning or reason. The text will demonstrate some of the
common factors that arise with each era of populism while some attention will be
paid to not over generalize these details as they still stand in distinct contrasts to
movements before and after them. Throughout the text we will see how within the
United States that populism is largely an ideology that generally makes its way
from the rural and suburban sections of the United States into the metropolitan
areas though this has changed somewhat with the advent of mass media that
has resulted in the increased speed of political polarization. Inversely, we shall
see in France that populism has often surrounded itself primarily not in the
countryside but rather in the capital of Paris and other urban centers throughout
the country and moved outward often with some degree of resistance as we shall
see during the French Revolution. Regardless of what any of us personally feel
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about it, the era of populism seems to be here with us to stay for some time so it
is proper to have a reckoning with what that has entailed and what it shall mean
for us as we push further into the twenty-first century. Next we can push into the
scholarship which remains highly contentious as populism remains a highly
topical issue with extensive connotations abound that leave emotions high. Few
topics in my research have been as utterly disagreeable among reputable
sources as this with virtually no one agreeing on either the nature of populism nor
whether it is a productive response to the inadequacies of modern systems.
Academia remains as divided on this issue as the world at large but with a deft
touch we might be able to piece together something resembling common
sentiments that we can analyze, deconstruct, and clarify to better understand this
spreading feeling of outrage.
I will note that while this work does contain analysis of the conditions that
have created populism, it primarily concerns much of itself with how it operates
within the western political sphere. For an impressive work that goes into better
detail on this I fully recommend Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative
and Theoretical Analysis by Takis S. Pappas.4 For the purposes of this essay I
will operate under the definition of populism as I see it which may be as troubled
as any other but is necessary to clarify. Populism is a loose political ideology
devoted to the mobilization of informally designated sections of the population
against ‘elites’ that are allegedly conspiring against them. This term carries
4

. Takis S Pappas, Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and
Theoretical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
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different connotations and realities based on the contexts in which it has
appeared in. Populism in relation to monarchical systems exists as a liberational
struggle to create a society built on the will of the governed. In nationalist matters
it exists as a way for privileged classes to attack marginalized groups such as
migrants who they feel threaten their hegemony in some manner. Within the
economic sphere it exists as a focal point from which movements can channel
discontent generally aimed towards the consequences of modern capitalism
though it is not necessarily acknowledged as such by said movements. These
are all faces of populism but none of them alone can provide the whole picture
nor are their motives necessarily any of these exclusively as the record should
reveal.
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CHAPTER TWO
SCHOLARSHIP REVIEW
The Nature of Populism and Its Virtues?
While no field that involves in depth academic discussion is without
disagreement nor should it, it is difficult to find a topic more divisive amongst
researchers. Some of this speaks to perceptions about populism broadly but
there are also notable contentions relating to its role throughout American and
French history specifically. There are significant disagreements on what
populism is and sometimes more importantly, what it is not. Mudde and
Kaltwasser in their contemporary text for Oxford’s piece on the matter contest
that it does have a specific meaning that goes beyond its existence in the present
as a political slur of sorts as some critics argue. Following this they declare that
their position on populism is what they refer to as the ideational approach which
in this instance means that they are taking it seriously as a definable ideology
rather than a loosely applicable term. They put forth that populism is primarily
abstract in nature while remaining universally bound by notions of ‘the people’ vs
‘the elite’ and that society should be molded by the will of the common masses.
For them populism is not strictly a full ideology within itself but rather an appeal
that might morph into more easily recognizable and perhaps structured forms of
thought.5

5

. Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal. Populism a Very Short Introduction.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.,1, 5-6.
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Another point of argument presented here is that populism is often defined by its
opposition in some manner to what we understand to be liberal democracy. This
opinion is shared by authors such as Pappas who suggest that populism often
acts as the figurative canary in the coal mine for failing liberal democracies as the
often capitalistic policies they put forth create stratification throughout society.
The idea put forth is not that populism is inherently undemocratic but that it often
falls into illiberal democracies such as Hungary. Indeed, for Pappas populism
exists as a nebulous shifting entity that swings between liberal democracy and
tyranny. A break in the consensus begins to present itself when debates
concerning who is a populist and where are they placed within the understood
political spectrums or if they in some ways transcend it. Much of the scholarship
ultimately concludes that populism is a form of appeal that can theoretically
manifest across the spectrum as it often resembles other ideologies as
previously noted which can often complicate issues particularly in instances such
as Argentina where the Justicialist Party carries both right and left factions that
compete for power internally.6
While several of the aforementioned authors are sympathetic to the
causes that result in the formation of populists movements, they are still
generally skeptical if not entirely hostile to them. The scholarly field concerning
populism has largely been opposed to it as a political approach for some time but
recent academics have begun to put forth that the connotations that we place

6

. Pappas, 5, 39, 50.
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upon all forms of populism may be intentionally or accidentally dishonest at
times. This can be observed in writers such as Nadia Urbinati who argues that
much of the discourse concerning populism is largely built around unjustified
assumptions. These can include contentions concerning if there really can be
such a thing as illiberal democracy or if the premise is fundamentally unsound.
This also includes skepticism about the approach that seems to underestimate
populism as a reflection of representative democracies within itself that is
ultimately a symptom and not the cause of the decline of allegedly
representational entities. Brought up into this discussion is populism's association
with despotism or at least the aforementioned illiberal democracies that it is often
accused of creating which again is a term of contention here. Urbinati contests
some of these assertions that place it as being synonymous with this sort of
quasi dictatorship but does note that while it sometimes exists in proximity to it
that it is not innately connected to authoritarianism as some critics will contend.
An example of this is the focus within fascism to the elevation of the state as the
dominant entity while also purposefully being fundamentally antidemocratic and
opposed to any such systems intrinsically as opposed to populism which purports
to be innately majoritarian. This is not to say as previously alluded to that
populism could not transition to such a system but neither is it a guarantee that it
ultimately will.7

7

. Nadia Urbinati, Me the People How Populism Transforms Democracy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019). 15-16, 19, 26.
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Another worth consideration within the literature is if populism is
necessarily an idea as much it might be a form of appeal or argumentation. We
can see this presented in authors such as Benjamin Moffitt who demonstrates
that populism can also be regarded as a political strategy that attempts to cast
the speaker as a purveyor of common wisdoms while also using language that is
deemed more suitable to the masses. While ideology and rhetorical strategy are
often linked this is not necessarily always the case. This sometimes expands
beyond language to encompass slang, accents, clothes and various other forms
of expression that are meant to indicate to the theoretical observer that said
individual belongs to whatever ‘the people’ means in the context as compared
to their opposition. This style of argumentation is furthered as Moffitt contends by
how appeals are made which is an extension upon who we should ascribe virtue
to. The primary division Moffitt argues is between the technocratic appeal
towards credentials and experts while populists in this instance appeal to
perceived collective experiences of the broader population. This is furthered by
differences in presentation with technocrats valuing often detached clinical
appeals that are deemed more objective in nature whereas the populist petitions
the emotions of the audience whether it be their fears or other sentiments. Again,
due to the common nature of populist appeals it becomes difficult to properly
ascribe the title of populist when mainstream political figures that have operated
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at the highest levels of power also attempt to make such appeals in fear that they
will be viewed as among ‘the elite’ regardless of their ideology.

8

Earlier Scholarship and the Nature of ‘The People’
Lest we run into the perils of recency bias in regard to the scholarship it is
important that we glance back towards some of the earlier academic studies that
became in vogue around the late 1960’s. The assortment of mass movements
that occurred before and leading up to the various global uprisings of 1968 likely
spurred this consideration. Perhaps one of the most established authors here is
Lawrence Goodwyn whose work is more sympathetic than most in his coverage
of the People’s Party of the United States. A repeated and not surprising
tendency that arises in most circumstances where we find populism is a wide
sense of a change that is not well received. As Goodwyn notes in his text, the
transitions of the American economy and other economies for that matter during
the mid 19th century resulted in revolutionary changes. No longer was the United
States the imagined agrarian economy favored by Thomas Jefferson of citizen
farmers but rather it developed with much of the rest of the world into industrial
modernity where the factory would come to dominate production.
While today we might regularly find media stories where populism is
synonymous with xenophobia, nationalism, and other detrimental concepts,
Goodwyn provides a relatable counter example. He argues that populism acted

8

. Benjamin Moffitt, Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and
Representation (Stanford, CA: STANFORD University Press, 2017). 51-52,
54-56.
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as a necessary counterbalance to the worst excesses of industrial capitalism in
an era of horrors such as child labor and being paid in company scrip. While
these farmers and laborers were not necessarily identical to socialists in ideology,
they carried similar ideas that would gain the ire of company and party bosses
who would use every available opportunity whether it was the media, policy, or
other methods in order to oppose them.9 The same pulse that eventually created
the Occupy Wall Street movement and the support for Sanders would echo from
here along with the labor movement in general that was gaining strength around
this time. This same sort of radicalism is noted by David R. Berman who notes
that these previous loose associations of ideas were not unwarranted or unnoted.
Berman’s work illustrates that these sentiments were not exclusive to pockets of
the country around farming communities but that they often spread more broadly
throughout the Great Plains region among other places .10
As illustrated by Moffitt, various groups that exist outside of populist
movements and thus outside ‘the people’ are often subject to harassment and
assault.11 What this further reveals is that while ‘the people’ are generally built
upon a majoritarian idea in nature that this is not necessarily wholly inclusive. In
the United States few right-populists would declare that undocumented
immigrants are in anyway a part of ‘the elite’ but at the same time these same
9
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individuals would certainly not consider them to be a part of the proper ‘people’ of
the United States of America. Benedict Anderson in his writings examines how
we might understand the creation of conceptual communities such as ‘the
people’ in this instance and the understood limitations that are often innate to the
discussion. While his work concerns itself with nationalism it translates well into
discussions of populism which could be understood to represent sub-national
grouping within the nation. Populism understands ‘the people’ to use similar
limitations in that it is both conceived as an entity that encompasses a limited
group of people that will never be able to completely know each other but they
still envision themselves as a part of a collective entity with shared values and
goals.12 We can imagine this for a moment by considering ‘the people’ as largely
envisioned by the two primary populist figures of our current era, Donald Trump
and Berine Sanders. For the former it is largely understood to represent primarily
white rural and suburban voters spread throughout the south and midwest. For
the latter it represents the lower 99% percent economic majority of the nation
across all other divisions. It also briefly gives a glance into how left and right
populists envision their respective versions of ‘the people’ as in-groups which
makes broader statements about populism challenging.
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Considerations on the Role of The Enemy
Much of the field also tackles an issue that is somewhat innate to any discussion
involving the presence of ‘elites’ which is the role of the conspiracy. By definition
‘elites’ are understood to be an exclusive organization of individuals that are by
some measure removed from the larger populace so it follows that their actions
and motives would be received with some degree of suspicion. The nature and
purpose of this conspiracy as with most matters involving populism is innately
tied to time and place but the field does provide us with some generalities that we
might examine. The conspiracy theory allows the simplification of complexities to
better focus the outrage of ‘the people’ upon a specific individual, group, or
institution as needed. Sometimes this can be an imagined threat or a designated
scapegoat though at times it can also represent a real historical threat as invoked
by figures in Latin America who have contended that they face imperialist foriegn
aggression from nations like the United States.13 The conspiracy theory also
provides explanations within populism for the failings of various movements as
noted by authors like Jan-Werner Muller. If populism is meant to represent ‘the
people’ then how are we to explain the failure of their ascent in democratic
systems? Muller contends that this is expressed by regarding the systems of
governance or those who control them as corrupted and thus unable or unwilling
to accept ‘the people's’ will. If ‘the people’ always remain ‘the people’ then it
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logically follows that opposition even in victory must follow from an ‘other’ that still
exerts some degree of control no matter how small or ethereal.14
Given the often heavily loaded language that is involved with populism
and its adjacent ideologies depending on the populist there is some recent
contention about if we understand populism as the movement or the figure that
often leads it. While populism is not intrinsically based around the presence of a
leader it is also rare for it to rise or maintain itself without such a charismatic
figure leading the way. Moffitt again expands upon this interesting paradigm that
exists within populism as the leader must ultimately be the individual figure who
performs the alleged will of ‘the people’ despite the ostensibly majoritarian nature
of the populist project. Moffit further contends that the leader paradoxically must
exhibit the aesthetic features of ‘the people’ while also expressing themself as a
figure that is able to transcend this commonality to be deemed worthy of their
position.15 We might also reconsider some earlier populist movements in the
absence of a leader figure. Much has been written about the allegedly unfocused
nature of Occupy Wall Street, which some claim is the reason that it petered out
as soon as it did, only for it to transform and become bigger than ever with the
arrival of Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders. On the other hand he Tea Party
movement from earlier in the decade was also seemingly leaderless though there
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is room for contention that while it lacked a formal political leader that it was not
necessarily without direction from various individuals
In a new twist that demonstrates the growing role of media throughout
much of the twentieth and twenty-first century we can find that the leaders of the
Tea Party were effectively the pundits of the Fox News Network as illustrated
within Skocpol and Williamson’s work. The various media personalities working
for the network advocated and encouraged the movement as a response to the
presidency of Barack Obama. In particular we can examine the role that Glenn
Beck specifically had at this time as a media leader of this populist movement
much in the same way that some might argue that Tucker Carlson on the same
network acts as a sort of media leader of the modern populist right despite his
privileged origins. While media has clearly previously played a role in populist
movements it rarely acted in a sense as the primary director of such sentiment
with such a direct link to the activities and thoughts of the participants that would
only really be possible in the modern era of daily news personalities that are
broadcasted across the country and sometimes the world.16 In previous eras
such a role may have been placed in radio personalities like Rush Limbaugh or
Father Charles Coughlin during the New Deal or in some sense perhaps William
Randolph Hearst and his styling of Yellow Journalism that would help create the
necessary sentiment to propel the United States into the Spanish-American War
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at the end of the 19th century. While any movement must eventually had some
degree of political leadership in order to focus the wants and needs of its
adherents, they can functionally survive on alternative forms of leadership until
they happen to come along like how Sanders did for the populist left or how
Trump would for the populist right or in the case of France Melenchon and Le
Pen respectively.
William D. Irvine in his work on the rise of the far right in France examines
the role that Georges Ernest Boulanger had as the populist visionary of
revanchism. As previously mentioned, populism has many times been co-opted
by traditional ‘elites’ to serve their purposes and Irvine contends that Boulanger
at heart was serving the royalist causes of France who found him useful in
appealing to audiences they never could.17 In Jeremiah Morelock’s work we can
find further support for the ways in which the leader can control and ultimately
subvert the mass will of ‘the people’ via authoritarian measures while still
ostensibly acting as their nominated champion. His contention is that some of the
earlier examinations of liberal democracies from the Frankfurt School
demonstrate that they inevitably move towards fascism. His reasoning for this is
that the conditions that are created by the economic realities that are created as
result of liberal capitalist policies ultimately help lay the groundwork for the rise
and return of these movements. He tracks the rise of neoliberalism from the end
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of the 1970’s which would culminate in the elections of Ronald Regan and
Thatcher which would signify a major changing point that would result in crises of
capitalism . Furthermore, he contends that these possibilities are not necessarily
contradictory as many right populists movements are a mixture of legitimate
political movements often refocused by the same political ‘elites’ that they rage
against. This statement is tempered though noting that both the movements and
the sentiments that spawn them were not largely an outright creation of ‘elites’ as
much as they were later manipulated for their purposes. He invokes Theodor
Adorno in his contention that in authoritarian populism the leader becomes
effectively an idealized projection of both the self while also embodying a sort of
platonic ideal of ‘the people’. The appeal is only heightened furthermore by the
sentiment that the leader is a focused apparatus of the will of ‘the people’ that
cuts through the corruption of ‘the elite’ and their institutions. 18
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
The Primary Approach
In order to evaluate both populism's historical position and the causes for
its recent insurgency in France and The United States we must engage with a
comprehensive yet straightforward approach. Again, my primary objective in this
piece is to ascertain the reason for the recent rise of populism throughout the
West with a focus on the United States and France. My general conclusion is that
this is a recurring historical consequence of the contradictions created by liberal
democracy that promised a society that never fully was realized. My choice to
focus on the United States and France is due to both their storied histories as
perhaps the first nations born into the democratic modern era along with their
connections to each other. Furthermore at this point I contend that there is an
essential element of populism that resides in what might be described as the
national mythology which makes them the most clearly suitable. Populism as
previously noted is largely a response based on lived experiences of the
populace due perceived degradations in the economic, social, political , and
cultural spheres so it falls that these are areas worthy of analysis in this
examination.
This in turn requires a multilateral examination that combines quantitative
and qualitative elements in order to best demonstrate the surprising complexities
involved in the development and ongoings of populist thought. The quantitative
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end requires an analysis that demonstrates the statistical realities present
including immigration records, job reports, census data, and other measures that
ground the approach in more than just conjecture. The qualitative matter is
critical as well because populism is more than just charts, it is an idea that
revolves around lived experiences that do not necessarily translate to data and in
some cases actively contradict it. This is why it is necessary to include a record
of speeches, songs, films and political cartoons among other things to
demonstrate how populism manifests.
This information was largely collected over the course of several months
as it became clearer to me what the evidence I saw invoked. An undeniable
aspect of a vast majority of populist movements are related to economic
concerns in one manner or another whether this is related to economic
depressions or the perceived threats of migrants which mixes it with nativist
elements. In turn this required examining the census information that would
reveal what fueled the nativist animosity of the Know-Nothings or economic
reports that would lay the groundwork for Occupy Wall Street and the Yellow Vest
movement. Much of the quantitative data was gathered from government records
for which this seemed the most reliable considering that several of these
organizations were either loosely organized or in some cases quasi-clandestine.
It was worthwhile to either corroborate or in some instances complicate some of
the claims presented by the populists. The qualitative information required a
greater deal of creativity but was largely intuitive considering the objective of
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populism to organize and represent the frustrations of sections of the public.
Qualitative populist sources by their nature often want to be found which made
the task one more curation rather than deep diving through obscure texts. On this
matter it became a task of understanding the purpose of the qualitative
information as it meant to be conveyed and to whom for what intended effect.
Given the often bombastic stylings of populism it became evident that audiences
ranged from the faithful to ‘whomever this may concern’ with some implicitly
understood limitations based on the subject.
One facet that was just as interesting when doing the research for this
project was examining the ways in which writers spoke about populism. Much of
this has already obviously been covered in my historiography but some broader
notes about this might be helpful. As previously noted much of the field is led by
a general disdain for populism with several authors providing some contrast that
either humors or accepts some of its principles while fewer more endorse them.
This can be demonstrated in various fashions both in books that speak directly
about populism broadly and texts that concern themselves with specific people or
movements. This sentiment has not gone unnoticed in this document when
evaluating the various secondary sources.
Challenges Presented
‘A challenging matter when analyzing historical sources is that we are
required to make some judgments concerning what constitutes a populist or
populist movement. The term itself as noted more later was coined during the
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late 19th century to primarily refer to the People’s Party in the United States.
Both before and after it is actually quite rare for notable political movements and
leaders to broadly describe themselves as populist up until relatively recently.
What can and has been done about this is I have largely to go by some measure
of consensus based upon the broader scholarship which is generally more
agreeable to the question of who is a populist rather than any other matter
though not without some dissent. I have also attempted to distinguish between
individuals and movements that are truly populist in nature and those who
occasionally will invoke populist methods in order to increase their appeal. Again
this distinction is more of an art than a science necessarily so I would quite
credibly expect the same degree of disagreement that largely defines the present
field in this matter.
Another aspect of my methodology that I chose was to as previously noted
primarily focus on what we might call sources that wanted to be found. My
reason for doing so in this project is to primarily examine the ways in which
populists present and understand themselves which helps demonstrate the
conscious ways they attempt to appeal to the public . An obvious issue with this
is that it perhaps takes the matters that populists raise at their word and focuses
the study around this rather than attempting to complicate it more by uncovering
purposefully obfuscated information. A different and just as valid methodology
might have gone on the quantitative end to uncover some data that would
complicate the message more. Qualitatively someone might attempt to hunt more
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often for ‘off the record’ statements or letters that contradict the message though
this document does occasionally make note of those as to not take things upon
face value exclusively.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROTO-POPULISM, ITS CRITICS, AND THE
CREATION OF ‘THE PEOPLE’
Populism and Its Precedents
Clarifying what is generally meant when we talk about populism is
inherently difficult but again the most basic statement is that it is a political
orientation that advocates for the popular will against that of the designated
privileged ‘elite’. From this it should be acknowledged first that even the phrasing
of talking about ‘the people’ in this instance is a relatively recent phenomenon for
much of the world. This is because for there to be a “people” to appeal to then it
logically follows that there must be an idea of a common people who relate to a
nation or some other similar collective entity. Authors such as Benedict Anderson
have examined the creation of these informal and conceptual communities that
have formed during the last several hundred years or so. Before the
enlightenment such conceptions would have largely been limited to religious
connection or various communities that lived as subjects to monarchs which
limited their capacity to imagine themselves as a part of a broader cultural entity
based on other factors. There exists some exception to this within some of the
Greek city-states or perhaps the idea of being a Roman citizen amongst some
other possible examples but largely these sentiments in their current iterations
stretch back to around the 18th century where we would begin to see the
weakening of power under the church and monarchies of the world and thus
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room was created for new forms of identity. This new sentiment as Anderson
notes is not merely limited to geographical spaces but newly attached to figures
throughout time as there becomes perhaps an essential idea of what it is to be a
part of this new conception of the nation. An example of this is the way in which
someone might look back upon an event no matter its scale and feel a sort of
kinship throughout time with the involved parties as they attempt to relate their
experience. We might imagine in theory how a frenchman writing in the 1940’s
during the occupation by Nazi Germany might relate to the experience of an
individual living through the Hundred Years War even though said individual
would not likely share the same ideas concerning what it is to be French.19 It is
perhaps with the French Revolution that we shall examine further later in the text
and be able to see the most significant growth into the conception of ‘the people’
as an understood potential political entity that could be organized. With the
decline of the monarch and the aristocrats there has been the fall of the subject
and the rise of the citizens of the state.
Populism oddly as an ideology may have had its most foundational critics
live and die long before its arrival upon the world stage. Plato, living within the
relatively democratic society of Athens but also having lived as a friend of his
mentor Socrates during his trial and subsequent death, opined about how
democracy eventually leads to tyranny as a part of a cycle that Greek authors
often referred to as a Kyklos which contributed to his vision of the society of

19

. Anderson,. 4, 12, 26.

30

philosopher kings.20 Thomas Hobbes in his various works including Leviathan
articulated a vision of society in which rule by elites was not only natural but the
primary bulwark against terror and chaos in the world. Hobbes argues that
without such rulership from the top that man is in his words in “The War of All
Against All” where social darwinism would be the rule of the day as society
collapsed under violence.21 Hobbes speaking during the 17th century likely was
able to witness some measure of both democratization and the weakening power
of the monarchy and church starting at the signing of the Magna Carta and going
through the Protestant Reformation where christendom became divided
regionally as protestant bases began arising in regions such as the German
states. Peasant revolts were also not an unfamiliar concept at this time which
may have also led the way to broader ideas about the collective identity of the
masses of society in opposition to the nobility and royalty though at this time
criticisms would more likely relate to the unjustness of specific individuals rather
than systems.
The Introduction of Populism on The World’s Stage
Perhaps the dominant figure in introducing a true populist sentiment in a
measurable way into the United States would be Thomas Paine. While Paine
would become known for his many works such as the Age of Reason and the
Rights of Man that would define the American ideological canon and that of the
20
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late Enlightenment. It was with Common Sense that he first had to tackle
something that seems intuitive to us today but revolutionary in its prospects back
then. He brought forth the question if ‘elites’ had any sort of rights to rule over the
common man in the first place which had largely been at least tacitly accepted
until that point with little argument otherwise. He put forth that such rulership was
both undesirable in a secular sense and went further to cite biblical scripture to
argue that it was unnatural before God. For there to be a ‘people’ and ‘elite’ for
the sake of populism first requires that there would be a sense of animosity for
the latter from the former. As mentioned previously this existed on an individual
level or perhaps if there was a sense that the rulership was a foriegn occupier but
rarely before this was it as broadly critical as this. What Paine argued was that
this sense of the ‘elite’ was a systemic issue and that kings and nobility are
innately a destructive force upon the larger populace that they attempt to exploit
and control. Paine would clarify this directly within Common Sense when he
says.22
“But there is another and greater distinction for which no
truly natural or religious reason can be assigned, and that is,
the distinction of men into KINGS and SUBJECTS. Male and
female are the distinctions of nature, good and bad the
distinctions of heaven; but how a race of men came into the
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world so exalted above the rest, and distinguished like some
new species, is worth enquiring into, and whether they are
the means of happiness or of misery to mankind
In the early ages of the world, according to the scripture
chronology, there were no kings; the consequence of which
was there were no wars; it is the pride of kings which throw
mankind into confusion. Holland without a king hath enjoyed more peace
for this last century than any of the monarchial governments in Europe.”
Paine follows later in the work with a specific proclamation that directly targets
the enlightened despot that Plato and Hobbes advocated for by demonstrating
that such an entity is largely imaginary and that the truth is more dour when he
says.23
“In England a king hath little more to do than to make war
and give away places; which in plain terms, is to impoverish
the nation and set it together by the ears. A pretty business
indeed for a man to be allowed eight hundred thousand
sterling* a year for, and worshipped into the bargain! Of
more worth is one honest man to society, and in the sight of
God, than all the crowned ruffians that ever lived.”
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With this proclamation the torch would be lit that would inspire both the
revolution at home while also laying the necessary groundwork for what was to
come ranging from France to Russia.24
The French Revolution would take inspiration from the American
Revolution in its desire to shed the dominion of kings and autocrats as a new
consciousness was raised throughout the nation. While this new rebellion in
similar fashion to the American Revolution was largely dominated by bourgeois
lawyers, merchants, and other well to do individuals it did find its share of support
among the larger populace, though much of this was relegated to the inhabitants
of the cities comparatively. While the origins of the American Revolution revolve
around the sense that Americans perceived they were not being treated properly
by the British Parliament and eventually King George The Third, the French
Revolution would prove even more daring in its goals. Whereas the ‘elites’ of the
American colonies might be understood to be foriegn aristocrats, in France the
issue was an internal matter based on the restrictions it placed upon the
autonomy of the larger populace. The Estates General in France was divided into
three sections that represented the will of the clergy, the nobility, and the
commoners. The first two were largely attached to each other with their support
and were able to consistently outvote the commoners despite the commoners
making up a significantly higher amount of the population than the the first two.
The other factor related to this is that the clergy and the nobility were largely
24
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exempted from taxes on the grounds that they allegedly already did their share
by interacting with God and fighting in the military respectively. From here it is not
much of a stretch to think that ‘the elite’ of French society was openly conspiring
and manipulating the political system against ‘the people‘. Beyond the evident
lack of power by the commoners they faced even more immediate issues such
as the economic circumstances that were caused by France's support for the
American Revolution along with earlier conflicts and issues concerning taxation
upon an ironically unrepresented population that would culminate in a financial
crisis in 1787. In 1789 at the Estates-General we would see the crowning of the
French citizenry as the force that would drive the nation with the creation of the
National Assembly with the Third Estate joining with elements from the church in
order to effectively create a new government with others from the First and
Second Estates joining in swiftly afterwards. The Assembly was threatened by a
potential counter action by the military who due to desertion and other factors
collapsed against the citizens of France with the storming of the Bastille.As noted
in Doyle’s work the reaction even amongst some of France’s elevated
bourgeoisie who favored the National Assembly would soon find many of their
greatest fears realized as the newly empowered people of France would soon
deliver their retribution in swift order.25
While the French Revolution would ultimately be a dramatic turning point for the
better for the world as feudalism and the rule of monarchs would be withered
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away, it was not without its other consequences. During the Terror that would
follow ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ would become nebulous shifting categories that
would change rapidly. In Edelstein’s work we can find some of the origins of the
distinct phrase “enemies of the people”' to describe the ascribed
counter-revolutionaries who would allegedly sabotage the revolution. This
sentiment is demonstrable in the case of how Georges Danton who had been the
first President of the Committee of Public Safety and a major force in the defense
of the revolution still managed to find himself on the other end of the guillotine in
the end in 1794 after falling out of favor.26 As previously noted the peasantry
located throughout the countryside were less inclined to go along with the new
radicalism of the urban citizens which often resulted in planned mass drownings
via loading people on boats and sinking them near cities like Nantes. ‘The
people’ and ‘the elite’ would evolve past disputes against the nobility and clergy
to become disputes between the Jacobins and the Girodins concerning what was
the appropriate action to take for the new French State. Ironically Thomas Paine
himself who helped inspire much of this new fervor for freedom would find
himself imprisoned for years as his association with the Girodins would come to
haunt him resulting in his near execution. This would then extend to inner party
conflicts among the Jacobins themselves as individuals were elevated to and
subsequently removed from power often quite violently.27 One of the most striking
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examples that placed ‘the people’ to an elevated state of being as something to
be worshiped was Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being. He articulated his
vision for this at the Festival of the Supreme being where he said.28
“The Author of Nature has bound all mortals by a boundless chain of love and
happiness. Perish the tyrants who have dared to break it!
Republican Frenchmen, it is yours to purify the earth which they have soiled,
and to recall to it the justice that they have banished! Liberty and virtue together
came from the breast of Divinity. Neither can abide with mankind without the
other.
O generous People, would you triumph over all your enemies? Practice justice,
and render the Divinity the only worship worthy of Him. O People, let us deliver
ourselves today, under His auspices, to the just transports of a pure festivity.
Tomorrow we shall return to the combat with vice and tyrants. We shall give to
the world the example of republican virtues. And that will be to honor Him still.”
We might note how in this speech he continually refers to the audience as
‘people’ in a sense as a larger entity rather than just denoting the plural which
demonstrates the new sentiment from the heights of power during this regime.
Robespierre and indeed much of the French Revolution would end with the rise
of Napoleon who ironically became the emperor built on the promise of defending
28
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these new populistic ideas of government. Napoleon would carry many of these
new republican standards in his march throughout Europe as he lived the
contradictory nature of the emperor of ‘the people’ effectively as nations across
the continent united against a common enemy that was at the front of this new
fervor. While Europe was no stranger to wars there existed a specific incentive
for the rulers of nations to see this put down lest the sentiments from the French
Revolution pass through their nation. The defeat of Napoleon and the ideals he
allegedly represented would put populism on the backfoot for sometime but it
would arise again and again as the genie could not be put back into the bottle for
people knew that a collective autonomy was within their grasp if they dared to
take it.29
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CHAPTER FIVE
POPULISM, ECONOMIC ROOTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Capitalism, Industrialization, and The 19th Century
Populism as alluded to early can best be understood as a reactive
ideology that arises to various forms of negative stimulus that are a result of the
failure of larger structures or more immediate events. While it might be
reductionist to declare economic matters to be the sole or even arguably the
primary reason for its arrival throughout time, its continued presence through
most populist movements is a near constant. Perhaps a relevant consideration
for why this is the case should consider yet again the roots of populism as a
historical entity in the late 18th century. During this period we not only see the
roots of liberalism that denotes a particular form of democratic action and
sentiment but also the rise of capitalism. Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations
would see its first volume printed in 1776 which would expand further throughout
the years with new volumes that would help shape the world to come.30 With the
ascent of capitalism we would also see dramatic changes to concepts concerning
labor, trade, finance, and industry among others. While this would prove to be a
significant upgrade over the generational landed serfdom of feudal relations as
even its critics like Marx argued, it would not be without its own significant
problems that are still unresolved for the foreseeable future. The creation of
capitalism would result in the development of new economic classes of
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individuals based on either their financial successes or relationship to their labor
depending on the analytical lens used in this instance. With these new systems
eventually becoming both a material reality while also being internalized by the
population as relevant to a new set of values it becomes likely that problems
would abound as inequities increased. What some of the following examples
demonstrate is the ways in which these new economic principles and practices
would reveal the contradictory nature of the same new democratic principles that
it was swept in with.
While we can acknowledge movements that are similar in principles and
structure that precede the People’s Party of the United States, it is with them that
we finally arrive at what would become the namesake that would define how
American academics would broadly examine populist thought which can be
located in Argersinger’s work. The People’s party arose during perhaps the
height of economic and social changes in much of western society during the
post Civil War era where industrial society was swiftly modernizing but not always
in ways that were universally well received.31 A component of populism in this
matter is that what is sometimes seen as the inevitable and desirable aspects of
“progress” are usually more complicated in nature as noted by Appleby, Hunt,
and Jacobs in their work.32 The People's Party did not spring forth from the ether
suddenly in an instant surge of popular fury but rather it was cultivated through
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years of resentment at party bosses that dominated the political spheres of these
areas. It is rarely a single election or other significant event that drives thousands
to millions of people to decide that there is a coordinated effort to subvert the
popular will by forces visible or unseen. The trigger is usually one that is primed
years to decades ahead of time that is waiting for what will send it over the edge
either in the form of an event or successful organization by the involved parties.33
While the People’s Party was broadly frustrated by the entrenched political
interests of the region the dominant cause for their organization when they were
known originally as the Farmers Alliance was in order to counteract the crop-lien
system that put sharecroppers into a system of subservience to local merchants
who often owned the land and necessary supplies. This system would lead to
these farmers effectively becoming indentured servants tied to agrarian contracts
that they would never be able to fulfill as their crops were sent off to the lenders.
These demands would later be intertwined with others but the essential factor
here is the sense that they were living in near feudal conditions as they worked
the land to benefit merchants who were often attached to party bosses that acted
as gatekeepers for any unwanted potential intrusions into their domain.34 This
contributed to a distrust of the political system that can be found in this cartoon
that was placed in the Washington state paper for the People’s Party, The
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People’s Advocate, that represents the broader frustrations felt by these
populists. 35

Figure 2. People’s Advocate Cartoon

We might find a similar sentiment today in the discussion over whether
members of congress should be able to trade stocks due to the capability for
insider trading and the ability to influence the value of stocks via legislation. The
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reaction from this is demonstrable in polling from Morning Consult/Politico that
provides us with the following reaction from across the American spectrum. 36

Figure 3. Congressional Stock Trading Poll

While modern Americans may not have the specific problems felt by the
agrarian populists of the People’s Party, there clearly exists a sentiment that
businesses interests and politicians are in collaboration in sometimes
demonstrably illegal ways to support each other instead of the country.
The earlier efforts by the populists around the nation would culminate in
the candidacy of Williams Jennings Bryan for the presidency of the United States
36
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running on the Democratic Party ticket. Fittingly, Bryan had the nickname of “The
Great Commoner” due to his known populist beliefs that pushed him to the
candidacy and which would keep him making further attempts after failing to
secure the presidency in 1896. Bryan’s name would eventually become infamous
shortly before he died as part of the Scopes trial in 1925 where he dueled with
famed lawyer Clarence Darrow over the teaching of evolution but for a time he
was the leading figure of populism within the United States. Bryan’s particularly
specific brand of populism revolved around issues endemic to turn of the 20th
century America that are can be found throughout his famed “Cross of Gold”
speech that he delivered at the 1896 Democratic convention after securing the
nomination from his party.37
“...The gentleman from Wisconsin has said he fears a Robespierre. My
friend, in this land of the free you need fear no tyrant who will spring up from
among ‘the people’. What we need is an Andrew Jackson to stand as Jackson
stood, against the encroachments of aggregated wealth...
...Mr. Carlisle said in 1878 that this was a struggle between the idle
holders of idle capital and the struggling masses who produce the wealth and
pay the taxes of the country; and my friends, it is simply a question that we shall
decide upon which side shall the Democratic Party fight. Upon the side of the idle
holders of idle capital, or upon the side of the struggling masses? That is the
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question that the party must answer first; and then it must be answered by each
individual hereafter. The sympathies of the Democratic Party, as described by the
platform, are on the side of the struggling masses, who have ever been the
foundation of the Democratic Party...
...If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the gold standard
as a good thing, we shall fight them to the uttermost, having behind us the
producing masses of the nation and the world. Having behind us the commercial
interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we shall answer
their demands for a gold standard by saying to them, you shall not press down
upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify mankind upon a
cross of gold.”
A critical detail to note before moving on is Bryan’s invocation of Andrew
Jackson in his speech. On a policy and personal level there is a limited amount
of connection between the two men beyond the broad notion of entrenched
wealth and yet we find it present here. What this reveals is an understood
political legacy of populism among populists regardless of policy which will
continue as we examine further on. Perhaps in the present we rarely pay much
consideration to the historical impact and debate surrounding monetary policy but
this was actually the founding issue of the Greenback Party following the Civil
War who would serve as precursors to the People’s Party. The use of gold
instead of fiat currency as the backbone of the economy was largely favored by
financial ‘elites’ centered out of the American Northeast in the tradition of
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Alexander Hamilton. Paper money comparatively was favored by these populist
groups due to policies surrounding gold and silver that often led to deflation
which affected these rural inhabitants. This difference as alluded to in Bryan’s
speech at its core is still a dispute between the financial interests of ‘the people”
broadly versus ‘elite’ monied interests even if now this war seems to be over
beyond the interests of a relative few.38
The Great Depression and its Ramifications
The Great Depression is perhaps the most obvious historical event that
contributed both to the rise of various ideologies as the failures of the Gilded Age
were laid bare. While communism and fascism had successes across the world
within the United States we can primarily detect a trend toward populism.While
often confused and sometimes intermingled with populism, there are some
necessary qualifiers that distinguish them from populism that are worth briefly
examining. Broadly, communism elevates the working class while fascism
elevates the state to the position that populism nebulously attaches to ‘the
people’. Though the lines begin to blur as previously mentioned, populism
sometimes transcends traditional political understandings which is evident in the
case of Huey Long and how the economic realities of his era paved the way for
this style of politics. A quick glance at the unemployment rates provided by the
United States Census going from the late 20’s throughout the 1930’s helps
elaborate on the material conditions that people were responding to.
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Figure 4. Census Unemployment Rates

In this labor data which expresses these numbers in 1/1000 ratio, the
unemployment rate nearly tripled from 1929 going into 1930 before nearly
doubling that following into 1931 then multiplying by one and half times itself
before finally settling at its worst in 1933.39
In circumstances such as these it is not unimaginable that a figure like
Huey Long could come about who was both able and willing to provide relief and
growth to an ailing population. While Long was perhaps better known for his
showman-like nature that will be demonstrated further in this piece, the economic
39
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realities of his time as governor help us establish his base of popularity that he
was planning to use to eventually run for president in 1936 before he was
assassinated. Long had a great success in a similar vein to what would happen
in various New Deal programs with large scale construction programs throughout
the state of Louisiana. This included the construction of over one hundred new
bridges throughout the state and nearly two thousand more miles of highways
which was nearly an eightfold increase in just four years as the governor. While
slogans alone could put Long into office, it was projects like these that may have
convinced the citizens of Louisiana that his nearly autocratic control of the entire
state might have been worth it.40
Long’s appeal given the context of the era is perhaps best summarized in
the song he co-wrote which ostensibly explained his basic platform and appeal.41
“Why weep or slumber America
Land of brave and true
With castles and clothing and food for all
All belongs to you
Ev'ry man a king ev'ry man a king
For you can be a millionaire
If there's something belonging to others
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There's enough for all people to share
When it's sunny June and December too
Or in the winter time or spring
There'll be peace without end
Ev'ry neighbor a friend
With ev'ry man a king”
While this piece is certainly catchy and the message at least somewhat
admirable, it is relevant to understand that this was effectively propaganda
produced by the state dictator at this point.
Long’s appeal did not go unnoticed outside of Louisiana where his
great charisma and popular policies made him a leading figure to challenge FDR
going into the election of 1936. The American writer Sinclair Lewis wrote one of
his biggest works It Can’t Happen Here which follows the rise of a dangerous but
charming political figure that intentionally resembles Long in many ways. In the
text this demagogue becomes the president of the United States and imposes a
fascistic totalitarian government.42 It remains up to debate the absolute specifics
of Long’s policies on the political spectrum given how closely they seem to be
tied to his own character which is perhaps one of the defining notions of populism
broadly. When asked about his political ideology or affiliations all Long had to say
about it was "Oh, hell, say that I'm sui generis (Of his own kind) and let it go at
that” which above all else may be the defining statement in how we may
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understand populism as a complicated and leader focused historical force.43
What Long also reveals to us is the appeal within these systems of a dictator that
you agree with. Long might have acted like an autocrat but he was their autocrat.
Long’s despotism was not a secret but given the circumstances it isn’t difficult to
understand his appeal. High minded ideals about sacred institutions often ring
hollow when they aren’t helping you obtain employment or feed your family.
We may contrast this with France during the same time period where
some interesting details appear. While much of the world like the United States
was defined by the dire impact that the Great Depression had, France stands in
contrast due to the relative way in which it managed to avoid the worst of it and
the ramifications of such. The data shows that France would feel the effects from
the depression both later and with lesser intensity than many of its peers as it
would peak several years later in 1936 compared to 1933 or so for the others. It
would be inaccurate though to say that France was uninhibited by the
Depression and that there was not some political response. The primary result
would be the February 1934 crisis where fascist and fascist adjacent groups
rioted in Paris over various causes which also included issues related to
domestic agriculture and farmers who represented approximately one third of the
French populace. Shortly after this the standing government collapsed and
multiple resignations resulted in a temporary government that would last until
later that year. While perhaps forgotten now this sort of fascist adjacent populist
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riot resulted in a counter action from the left who would respond by making their
own suitably called Popular Front. This division would foreshadow the divides
and sympathies of some of the population of France during their the Nazi
occupation.44
Post World War Two Until The Present
Following World War 2 there would be a return to the economic realities
that often spawn populism with Pierre Poujade who was a French politician who
combined various economic grievances based around taxation among the
French populace and combined it with the usual suspects: xenophobia,
anti-intellectualism, anti-semitism and distaste for the urban centers of the
nation. Poujade began this with his time as a small store owner who organized
other small business owners against what was perceived to be unfair actions by
tax collectors. This would lead to the formation of the Union de Défense des
Commerçants et Artisans or the Defense Union of Shopkeepers and Craftsmen
which acted as his political arm and movement.45 The numbers involved in this
matter were not insignificant either in that by 1955 his organization would amass
approximately five hundred thousand members and obtain around twelve percent
of the vote in the election of 1956 which granted them 56 seats in parliament. As
with many populist movements though it proved an easier task to criticize rather
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than to attempt to govern and thus they would eventually lose their momentum.46
While his movement was short lived it does again remind us that populism is
never far away even coming out of a post-war victory if the fundamentals of
liberal capitalism go unaddressed. It also demonstrates again that the
momentum created by populist movements are often generally attached to their
leadership which can be swept away much faster than we see in comparative
more ideologically rugged political theories. It might also again indicate to us that
while not necessarily the case we should note as with Poujade that “economic
anxieties” are often not the exclusive reasons for this sort of populism which
often hides more dangerous sentiments.
While the totality of the causes for the beginning of the return of the
populist left within the United States are likely intricate beyond the purposes of
this text, it can be said with some degree of confidence that the most likely
contributor was the 2008 Financial Crisis. The events of the crisis had impacts
across the United States and the world as millions of people lost their homes and
jobs as the schemes that were maintained by Wall Street fell apart under the
weight of their own pressure and lack of regulation. The individuals who were the
most directly responsible for the collapse were rarely if ever meaningfully
punished as the populace saw that they were deemed ‘Too big to fail’ and in turn
they would be allowed to hold on even if their victims could not. With the signing
of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 during the last months of
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the Bush administration these institutions would revitalize out of a perceived
sense of necessity that is still heavily disputed to this day. Regardless of the
efficacy or worthiness of this, many Americans would broadly and perhaps
correctly determine that they were not who the government was acting in the
interests of and so determined to take matters into their own hands. While much
of this outrage may have been quelled briefly by the historic rise to power via the
election of President Barack Obama, this did not last long as it became evident
that policy in this instance would often go across party lines. It is with this that
we can understand this new and potent outrage that would arise in the early
years of the 2010’s.47
While disdain for Wall Street has always been common with its origins
perhaps in the early disputes between the Federalists and the Democratic
Republicans, it is here that a generation began to lose hope in the systems that
continue to operate the world economy and in turn the lives of working people
everywhere across the planet. The data provided by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics shows the sudden and dramatic decline of the economy in the United
States that completely disrupted the lives of many of its citizens.48
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Figure 5. 2008 Economic Crisis Data

As noted previously, populism is heavily attached to the failures of the
worst aspects of liberalism and modern capitalism where the populace of the
nations around the world conclude that ideas like the “American Dream” are
merely platitudes and that the emperor has no clothes when its institutions fail.
Populism in this matter effectively rises quickest when there is the least left to
lose.
The primary memorable reaction to this new feeling of economic
resentment that would bubble up over the years would be the Occupy Wall Street
movement that arose during September of 2011. While initially it was created by
local activists, a call for action by the activist magazine Adbusters would help
spread the message beyond the New York City area. It would soon come to
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encompass the broader outrage concerning the inequities created by modern
capitalism as people from across North America would arrive to protest. This new
fervor was summed up in the fundamentally populist slogan of Occupy Wall
Street “We are the 99%” which refers to the comparative net worth and
subsequent political influence of ‘the elite’ that occupy the remaining 1%. What
this meant within context is a struggle for various reforms that we still see
pursued today including debt relief, money in politics, and improvements
concerning work. The movement itself, largely leaderless hoping to gain the
benefits of being decentralized also faced the negatives. Despite the broad
messaging of who the movement encompassed, like many populists movements
it was hindered by infighting and disagreement over exactly what course ‘the
people’ should take to rectify the situation. This would naturally follow given the
wide variety of political ideologies that would be present among the inhabitants
throughout the protests with some of them ranging from capitalist libertarians to
mainstream liberals to avowed communists. The lack of a figurehead in theory
made it more difficult to quickly subvert but at the same time it also would leave it
somewhat directionless due to the purposeful lack of structures present. It also
faced the difficulty of being able to work the mechanisms of power in any
meaningful way which is part of the reason for the protest but without plausible
results or movement towards them the result is not surprising. Occupy lacked the
access to methods that other organizations like unions might have been able to
turn to such as a sit-in strike which would threaten the economic processes of
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their workplace thus creating incentive to meet their demands. Occupy would
slowly peter out over the course of several months which was only accelerated
by action from New York police against the protestors as they were removed from
Liberty Square in November of the same year.49 We shall revisit this briefly
mitigated but not lost sentiment later in the document with the arrival of its rebirth
during the Sanders Campaign later in the decade.
With the stakes of the next French election still unknown at this point we
may look at the last major point of French populism that we can find in the form
of the Yellow Vest protests which began in November of 2018 and are ongoing in
some form as of this writing. This was at least at its inception not a marginal
movement that managed to have the approval of 75% of the French public which
demonstrates both its specific wide appeal and more broadly the appeal of
economic populism across the political spectrum.50 The protests began as a
reaction to a protest to carbon taxes that were put in place by France’s president
Emmanuel Macron. The Yellow Vest movement arrived swiftly with the protestors
defined by the yellow vests often worn by the protestors that are required in
French vehicles by law opposing the increase of the price on gas among other
reasons. The reason for the tax was primarily to combat climate change but
much of the issue became the perception that this burden to alleviate it would be
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placed upon the average citizen rather than the wealthy corporations that largely
produce the emissions.51 It resembles Occupy in some manners but in others it is
distinctly French as both a result of a difference within French politics but also of
the historical protest culture of France as opposed to the United States. The
protests signify both the outrage against the specific conditions within France but
also the broader outrage against the neo-liberal policies that have come to define
much of western nations since the 1970’s with a mixture of individual grievances
that has allowed for such a diversity of inhabitants amongst it. What the split
reveals as noted is both the reach of economic populism but also the difficulty in
producing fruitful changes due to the significant split amongst the movement
about what to do about it and who should be leading these efforts.
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Chapter SIX
POPULISM AND ‘THE ELITE’
‘The Elite’ and its Historical Implications
Populism as an ideology is as defined by its out groups as much as its in
groups so it is critical to examine what the nature of ‘the elite’ means both in
modern contexts and various historical ones. As previously denoted current
conceptions are relatively recent but the general tropes involving ‘the elite’ are
largely timeless in nature. We can locate texts going back to Ancient Greece at
least denoting the opulence and arrogance of foriegn figures such as Persian
emperors which often carried orientalist notions of eastern decadence. We can
see many of these same tropes furthered throughout Europe during the last
millenia attached to local and foriegn entities but most notably within anti-semetic
screeds. This is demonstrable with the popularity of hoax texts such as The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion which purports to demonstrate a mass global
Jewish conspiracy which is not an unfamiliar claim in some of the more extremist
populist movements that veer into fascism.52 This should not be construed that
populism is innately anti-semetic in any sense necessarily just that we can
recognize some of the attributes as having a degree of commonality and that
some populist groups historically have notable anti-semetic beliefs. ‘The elite’ as
a vague entity can and has been accused of virtually every crime real or
imagined which are generally related to local social mores in order to establish
52
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boundaries between what constitutes a member of ‘the people’ and in turn what it
means to oppose them as we shall see.
As we have examined earlier in the text, there has been occasional
association between populist and socialist lines of support throughout American
history but this would be heavily tested following the end of World War Two. The
origins pull back perhaps all the way to the First Red Scare during the late 1910’s
as paranoia over the newly formed Soviet Union resulted in the Palmer Raids
toward the end of the decade.53 This would re-emerge towards the end of World
War 2 with the Soviet Union immediately becoming the obvious challenger to the
potential hegemony in the United States following the end of the war.
Populism and Paranoia
Perhaps the first sign of this would arise with future president Richard
Nixon himself who became a leading figure in the infamous Alger Hiss Case in
1948 which would eventually lead to a contested conviction in 1950 over
espionage charges. While the details of these issues are more appropriate for
another document their broad details reveal the mood of paranoia that had swiftly
swept throughout the nation so quickly deflating the post-war optimism. Hiss
himself was a peculiar figure whose manners and credentials as a Harvard Law
School graduate would mark him as an ‘elite’ to enemies of Roosevelt's New

53

. Regin Schmidt, Red Scare FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the
United States, 1919-1943 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University
of Copenhagen, 2000), 236.

59

Deal which would indicate some of the future signifying traits that would come to
define some of the divides in the United States that are still present today.54
This relatively new form of right populism declared that instead of ‘the
elite’ existing as a cabal of various party bosses and wealthy industrialists, they
operated in secret to overthrow the government to create a Bolshevik inspired
regime backed by the Soviet Union. While this idea on its face seems largely
both ludicrous and irresponsible to us right now we are not necessarily that far
away from it if we hone in on some of the rhetoric surrounding international
politics and the loaded language of words like ‘globalist’.55 These again are not
terribly different from previous often anti-semtic ideas such as international
conspiracies and dual loyalties but they would take on a new form as the century
dragged on.
Often lost to time in modern political discourses surrounding the post-war
United States was the sentiment that the United States government was treating
its new geo-political rivals in the form of the Soviet Union and China soon after
too lightly which seems difficult given the strength of response and propaganda
that did happen. We can specifically locate this in the public reaction at the time
to the firing of General Douglas MacArthur by Truman in April of 1951 after he
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went against the stated policies of Truman’s administration by writing letters both
private and public that called for an escalation to all out war with China.56

Table 1. Approval Of Firing MacArthur
Who’s Who”

“General Public”

Approve

51

25

Disapprove

46

66

No Opinion

3

9

We might extrapolate for a moment some of the perhaps assumed
information that we can gather from this polling. If we are to understand that 66
percent of the general public disapproved of his firing then we might convey that
to mean that the same amount were at least in some measure favorable to
MacArthur as a public figure. This polling again from Gallup demonstrates that
this would put him ahead of the average approval rating of every president since
they started recording with Truman with Eisenhower topping out the chart at 65
percent. This among other issues likely contributed to Truman regularly polling
under 30% approval rating throughout the last few years of his presidency, a
number that has only been matched by the final days of the George W Bush
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administration.57 The concern on the Truman administration's part is that
MacArthur was effectively attempting to use the bully pulpit as the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers to convince the American people using his
notable popularity. While it never went this far, we can think about earlier
civilizations in which popular military leaders via coups or other means have
attempted to subvert the standing government of the nation in which they
represent with the most dramatic case found in the Roman Empire during the
Third Century Crisis where generals regularly fought to become the new Emperor
every few years.
The ‘Elite’ and the Enemy Within
This new era of paranoia amongst much of the populace during the early
Cold War was brought about by this feeling either real or imagined that the
government was either too weak to deal with the perceived enemies of the
United States or were actively collaborating with them. It is not far from here that
we would see the creation of groups like the John Birch Society who helped
develop the conspiratorial culture of American politics that was solidified by
Richard Nixon again of all people after Watergate. It would develop into the same
paranoia that we might locate within the present delirious Q-Anon movement that
believes that secret parts of the government are waging a hidden war against
itself that often involves the presence of satanic rituals which call back to the old
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anti-semitc conspiracy of blood libel.58 In an era where there was no sensible way
to directly confront an enemy who also possessed nuclear weapons it follows
that any sense of urgency would fall into the inner sphere of the nation. An
important aspect that studying populism reveals is the way in which the often
complicated and sometimes misdirected feelings it invokes are exploited by
agendas that predate the present grievances.
Another issue of some significance in this analysis of the role of ‘the elite’
in populist visions is reconciling the fact that by definition ‘the elite’ are a limited
crowd yet they often manage to defeat populists within democracies. Again, this
concerns itself with the detail that ‘the people’ are a more limited group than the
term suggests and that each movement informally understands the relevant
limitations. What this in turn reveals is the influence of the ‘elites’ proxy in matters
concerning democratic action. This term can broadly be understood by various
concepts ranging from the dupe to the useful idiot which elaborates that there are
groups that are separate from ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ that nevertheless are
considered to be the thralls of the ‘elites’. This is regularly found within fascist
and fascist adjacent populist circles that declare that one group is manipulating
another for insidious ends against the ‘people’. Alternatively we might look
towards the concept of the lumpenproletariat within Marxism who operate as a
reactionary segment of the populace that operate on behalf of entrenched power
58

. Kate Conger, “Twitter Takedown Targets Qanon Accounts,” The New York
Times (The New York Times, July 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/technology/twitter-bans-qanon-accounts.ht
ml.

63

structures. Again we return to anti-semitic tropes distrubted throughout much of
the first half of the 20th century where we can derive he origins of the term
‘judeo-bolshevism’ or in modern circles ‘cultural Marxism'. Both overtly and subtly
it was implied by these groups that Jewish ‘elites’ were conspiring to subvert
‘traditional western value’. One way this was articulated was the premise that
Jewish people were promoting art created and performed by Black people such
as jazz for this task thus making them the unknowing proxy in this example.59
This can also be found in the modern day with arguments from right wing
populists that declare that their opposition is using undocumented immigrants to
win elections that they would otherwise lose.60 This idea is required in populism
because it manages the dissonance needed for when the ‘people’ are not in the
majority or even the plurality and thus creates a system where this is not required
and in fact reinforces their claim from their perspective.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POPULISM AS STRATEGY
Populism by Non-Populists
Despite its nature as a supposedly majoritarian ideology that is skeptical of
established political actors this has not prevented populism from arguably
becoming one of the dominant political strategies for individuals attempting to
enter the halls of power. On the surface this is both simultaneously contradictory
but also immediately obvious why this would be an effective tactic within
democratic or quasi-democratic systems. This chapter seeks to distinguish
populism's use as a road for both new and pre-existing figures seeking to either
create, re-establish, or bolster political careers both among traditional populists
along with those who occasionally invoke it when deemed valuable.
The presidency of Theodore Roosevelt has stood as one of the defining aspects
of what historians have traditionally called the Progressive Era. While this
certainly is not an uncomplicated term given the often measures by which we
define ‘progress’ for the sake of argument we may be able to at least contend
that this was an era of broader enfranchisement and increased democratic action
via various movements. Roosevelt would bow out of the election 1908 to allow
for William Howard Taft to run but his dissatisfaction in Taft’s presidency would
push him to attempt another run in 1912. Roosevelt who was born as functionally
a New York aristocrat had ironically become perhaps the first president
sympathetic to labor and the first to challenge the hegemony of American robber
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barons who had become the kingmakers of the Gilded Age by attempting to
implement his “Square Deal” agenda. This willingness to take a swing at these
economic and political ‘elites’ during this run may have also been inspired by his
opposition by Republican party bosses during his time as the Governor of New
York and subsequent attempt to hinder him via the limited office of the Vice
Presidency.
Roosevelt's “Bull Moose” party was led on a platform that would still be
considered radical for American politics over one hundred years later with calls
for policies such as universal health care.61 Much of the sentiment that Roosevelt
would bring as their candidate would be delivered on October 14th 1912 where
just before the speech an attempted assassin shot him in the chest. Undeterred
by this, Roosevelt would lay forth his vision for the party where we would see
some familiar rhetoric when speaking about his grievances with the party he
formally represented as president.
“When the Republican party - not the Republican party - when the bosses
in control of the Republican party, the Barneses and Penroses, last June stole
the nomination and wrecked the Republican party for good and all - I want to
point out to you that nominally they stole that nomination from me, but it was
really from you. They did not like me, and the longer they live the less cause they
will have to like me. But while they don't like me, they dread you. You are the
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people that they dread. They dread the people themselves, and those bosses
and the big special interests behind them made up their minds that they would
rather see the Republican party wrecked than see it come under the control of
the people themselves. So I am not dealing with the Republican party. There are
only two ways you can vote this year. You can be progressive or reactionary.
Whether you vote Republican or Democratic it does not make a difference, you
are voting reactionary.”
His ire was not reserved just for his party but also of the Democratic Party
of the time and their candidate Woodrow Wilson where he stated.
“Now, the Democratic party in its platform and through the utterances of
Mr. Wilson has distinctly committed itself to the old flintlock, muzzle-loaded
doctrine of States' rights, and I have said distinctly we are for people's rights. We
are for the rights of the people. If they can be obtained best through National
Government, then we are for national rights. We are for people's rights however it
is necessary to secure them.”62
A critical aspect of this speech is how Roosevelt emphasizes how political
bosses have conspired against him and subsequently the citizens of the United
States. This statement is completely in line with modern attempts to invoke
populism by figures such as Trump where we can again conflate attacks against
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the populist leader with attacks against ‘the people’ themself. The difference in
party platform also demonstrates again the ways in which populism is not strictly
connected to the recognized political habits of where it arises which in turn paves
the way for further movements down the line.
France and the French citizenry following World War 2 were in an era of
reckoning with themselves and their capacity to collaborate with a foriegn invader
that had gone against virtually every supposed principle that they have ever
espoused. This era would become famous for the plethora of French intellectuals
and other figures that would seek to make some degree of sense of what had
happened but ‘the people’ were not without individuals that they believed would
help provide direction again.. Perhaps the most prominent of these figures during
this era was the French statesman Charles de Gaulle who had been the leader of
the government in exile known as Free France. Despite his prominence during
the occupation and shortly afterward, he would disappear in a sense from the
highest echelons of French politics and adopt a more subtle role in the nation.
Perhaps his most populist inclination would be put forth in what he would call the
Rassemblement de Peuple Francais or Rally of the French People in English.
The stated purpose for the creation of the Rally of the French People was to
create an institution that was supposed to allegedly be above the various
conflicts that had made much of French politics in an effort to provide a common
banner that French citizens could gather under to unify after years of foriegn
occupation though given its strong anti-communist purpose, it would be hard to
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say that was particularly truthful. Charles de Gaulles motives for doing so are
ultimately questionable considering that there is significant evidence suggesting
that he was not truly done with French politics at this point but rather in a resting
spot so that he may swoop in to save the day once again with the French Rally
acting as a holding point for him. The French Rally found some degree of
success and managed to obtain some support across the political spectrum with
the majority of it coming from the right wing of France. The party would not
ultimately last long due to various reasons but the stage had been set for his
return later. France during the 1950’s would find its citizens embroiled in disputes
concerning its role as a world power. France had holdings in both French
Indochina and Algeria during this period which would see movements and wars
of independence throughout the decade. This would ultimately result in the
collapse of the Fourth Republic and with the birth of the Fifth Republic with
Charles De Gaulle writing much of the new constitution while being quite aware
of the optics of the moment as he conveniently reappeared again to guide France
out of a disaster.63 What De Gaulle was attempting again demonstrates the
flexibility that populism provides to the cynical and sincere alike. It allows for the
proposition of a new style of politics that can be claimed to be above the
traditional squabbles of political institutions while also coincidentally resembling
them again when put into a position of power.
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Populism and Bigotry
A particularly ugly form of regional populism would arise throughout parts
of the nation during the Civil Rights movement. Throughout the South but also
present elsewhere to a lesser extent, politicians saw the political value in
responding to the fears and anger of white racists. Several notable figures
ranging from Ronald Reagan to Richard Nixon who would coin the phrase ‘the
silent majority’ and be perhaps the first political candidate with perhaps the
exception of Barry Goldwater to make an implicit appeal to what would be called
the ‘southern strategy’ though Nixon himself argued it was started by
Eisenhower. This form of populism largely built upon prejudice was certainly not
new as seen by the regularly hateful rhetoric produced by the Know Nothings or
the Volkisch Movement in Germany but the prominence it would take throughout
much of the region would be. Oftentimes this rhetoric was cynical in nature with
the politicians using it as red meat to get or stay elected such as with President
Lyndon Johnson who regularly engaged in it before revealing greater depths by
passing the Civil Rights Bill. Likely nowhere else is this better demonstrated than
the tumultuous and ugly political career of George Wallace. Wallace would
eventually make a run for president that would be cut short by his attempted
assassination and in later years he would articulate his regrets due to a stated
religious revelation but he started far humbler. Wallace began his political career
by running as a fairly moderate candidate in a losing bid for Governor of Alabama
in 1958. After the loss he reportedly said to his associates “... no other
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son-of-a-bitch will ever out-n***** me again”. Wallace had essentially identified
that the core issue among the majority of white southerners was a lingering racial
resentment that has only diminished somewhat as of this writing. Wallace from
there used this as a springboard to re-establish himself as the nation's leading
southern populist when such a thing both overtly and subtly meant the goal of
maintaining white supremacy.64 He would mark this forever into the annals of
American History when he produced his infamous “Segregation Forever” speech
that he delivered in Montgomery on January 14th 1963 where he said
“Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis stood, and took an oath
to my people. It is very appropriate then that from this Cradle of the Confederacy,
this very Heart of the Great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we sound the
drum for freedom as have our generations of forebears before us done, time and
time again through history. Let us rise to the call of freedom- loving blood that is
in us and send our answer to the tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South.
In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line
in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . . and I say . . .
segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever.”65
In this speech he invokes the symbols of populistic rebellion where he
invokes imagery of the freedom of ‘the people’ against unnamed tyrants to justify
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the racial hatred held by him and his supporters. The ramifications of this are still
present as a significant if not majority of populist strains in the United States are
based on similar sentiments ranging from David Duke’s political career in
Louisiana to contemporary “MAGA” candidates following the presidency of
Donald Trump.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
POPULISM: APPEAL AND AESTHETIC
Trumpism and Its Language
Just as instrumental to the success and ongoing appeal of populism is the way in
which it is presented. Populism is more than political proclamations concerning
the secretive plans of its enemies. It is just as much if not more style than
substance with its own dress code and tongues and shibboleths that is meant to
convey a sense of legitimacy that informs that the speaker is of ‘the people’. It is
this same method that also informs the same audience of who their opposition is
which is communicated usually through the ‘elite’ bonafides of their opposition
which usually includes wealth, education, and connections. This position logically
follows for if the system and its institutions are thoroughly corrupt, what does it
say for the individuals that either prosper or control such systems. Just as
instrumental to populism is not merely the message but the mode itself. Populism
has spread throughout various technological forms as we shall clarify later but it
is the power of spoken address and more specifically the rally that has elevated it
to its greatest heights.
Populism existing as a part of the democratic tradition starting from the
introduction of liberalism largely carries many of the same expected elements but
it is its divergences that have brought it both success and notoriety. ‘The people’
and their assumed proxy leader exist in a fundamentally symbiotic relationship as
they feed off the energy that they provide each other until either they fail,
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succeed or become co-opted into larger structures. We can observe this in its
primary form: the rally where ‘the people’ and the leader are bolstered by their
physical proximity to each other. This is not necessarily an unusual phenomenon
in any sense of the word in that it is quite similar to the same energy that
performers ranging from comedians to professional wrestlers have mentioned
which help drive their performances. Populism bears some similarities to the call
and response style found in some music and religious traditions where the
speaker specifically relies on the presence of the audience for its style and
efficacy. This style echoes through in a speech delivered by Former President
Trump to an audience in Cedar Rapids, Iowa where he told his supporters to
“Knock the crap out of” anyone that might protest him within the audience to a
response of cheers.66
The question of what we can specifically attribute to the rise of Trumpism
is a common point of inquiry among academics and laymen alike which is
perhaps what has spurred much of this investigation into populism. While
seeking an origin point for any particular phenomenon is generally a dubious task
at best we for the sake of contention shall begin with the rise of the Tea Party
movement at the beginning of the 2010’s. It is with this information that someone
like Trump seems more like a nigh inevitable consequence of events rather than
an unexpected aberration. He began his presidential run with a largely incoherent
66
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speech that put forth every imagined grievance that the Tea Party and White
nationalists had been espousing for years up until that point.
“...Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories anymore. We
used to have victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody
saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the
time. All the time...
...So I’ve watched the politicians. I’ve dealt with them all my life. If you
can’t make a good deal with a politician, then there’s something wrong with you.
You’re certainly not very good. And that’s what we have representing us. They
will never make America great again. They don’t even have a chance. They’re
controlled fully— they’re controlled fully by the lobbyists, by the donors, and by
the special interests, fully...
...We have losers. We have losers. We have people that don’t have it. We
have people that are morally corrupt. We have people that are selling this country
down the drain...
...Sadly, the American dream is dead.”
But if I get elected president I will bring it back bigger and better and stronger
than ever before, and we will make America great again.... 67
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Trumpism as a populist force still remains a work in progress as is the usual of
populist projects. An idea worth consideration is that few if any populist projects
have seemingly ever had a tangible decisive victory against ‘the elite’. Even the
presidency of the wealthiest country on earth has not been enough to achieve
this. This is because this is a necessary aspect of populism that requires an
adversary much as fascism similarly does in order to perpetuate itself. Populism
often broadly lacks a defined end goal that we might imagine with systems like
Communism. For populists, ‘the elite’ are both powerful and ethereal, defeatable
yet never truly defeated, for to do that would make populists unnecessary.
As previously noted, for populists such as Trump there is an understood
political heritage that is separated from policy as demonstrated by his admiration
of Andrew Jackson. Despite the irony of Trump being a son of inherited New York
based wealth built on land speculation and development, this would not prevent
him from attempting to find kinship with Jackson. Again, the details of policy are
secondary to the sense of heritage and legitimacy that are often sought by
populist figures though in the case of Jackson this seems like a hastily
considered claim to stake given recent evaluations of his legacy.68
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Jackson, The Wealthy, and Populist Commonalities
On the matter of Jackson again, while we have ascertained the presence
of populism throughout the colonial era of the United States it would largely
disappear for a time before re-emerging. Andrew Jackson was perhaps the
biggest figure of populism in American history up until the twenty-first century and
also likely its most infamous recent examples included. Jackson shares some of
the common elements that we would see with some later populous figures like
Georges Boulanger and Douglas MacArthur in an indirect way with his military
service during the war of 1812. He would rise to prominence for his leadership at
the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 which would prove tragic in that declarations
for peace had already happened for the battle which was unknown to both sides
before it began. Perhaps one of the more benign aspects of his brand of
populism appeared at his inauguration where the White House was broadly open
to the voting public at the time. This would end up being a scandal within itself at
the time as some commentators describe it as a sort of drunken jamboree where
inauguration attendees managed to get into various bits of trouble though much
of it seems to have been exaggerated. As previously noted, populism is often
based on personal grievances and Jacksons was not born from a structured
ideology but was rather a personal response to the misgivings he had based on
his investment into land speculation.69 Jackson would also be defined by his
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unexaggerated hatred for the banking system which drove a considerable
amount of his ire which extended to the class of individuals he thought
responsible when he presented his veto for a national bank. Much of this was a
part of the still ongoing power struggle that had been ongoing since the nation's
independence between the northeastern financial interests and more rural based
agrarian land owners which clarifies some of the pre-existing conflicts when
Jackson says.70
“...It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of
government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist
under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can
not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of
Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is
equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these
natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and
exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the
humble members of society--the farmers, mechanics, and laborers--who have
neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right
to complain of the injustice of their Government…”
Within Jackson's presidency we can yet again see the boundaries
presented on who was properly considered a member of ‘the people’ that he
70
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claimed to represent against the monied ‘elites’. Andrew Jackson was a
prominent slave owner who enslaved dozens of people throughout his life who
we would never imagine as a part of any such democratic system.. This further
extends outward towards all of the marginalized Americans in the United States
who did not have the privilege of being able to be a part of ‘the people’. Again
this demonstrates the limitations both explicit and informal that are involved in the
creation of these groups that rather than be inclusive as their name suggests are
many times highly selective.
The Revival of Left Populism
Following the failure of Occupy Wall Street the American left would
temporarily disappear from the mainstream for several years.This movement
would see its new champion rise during the 2016 Democratic primaries where
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would receive her primary challenge and
with that a rebuttal towards mainline centrism that had dominated much of
American politics since the Carter administration. With all of the populist figures
presented so far we can safely say that Vermont senator Bernie Sanders was
probably the most unlikely candidate at first appearances. Rather than the
bombastic personalities of figures like Huey Long or Teddy Roosevelt, Sanders is
often passionate but also somewhat more reserved with less of an emphasis on
the traditional rhetorical flourishes of earlier populists. Despite his status as
democratic socialist since his youth, his advocated policies largely call for a
return to the policies of the New Deal and the Great Society put forth by earlier
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Democrats before they shifted gears following the Nixon administration. ‘The
elite’ he rallies against is not a vague class of individuals with dubious charges
placed against them but rather a highly observable and privileged group in the
form of billionaires. This sentiment as previously mentioned is not new as we can
find earlier figures that rallied against the industrialists and robber barons of their
day up through the Gilded Age but Sanders has refined his message for the
modern era of the twenty first century. He began his campaign with.71
“...Today -- today, with your support and the support of millions of people
throughout our country, we begin a political revolution to transform our country
economically, politically, socially, and environmentally.
Today, we stand here and say loudly and clearly, "Enough is enough. This
great nation and its government belong to all of the people, and not to a handful
of billionaires."
Let me be very clear, and let the top 1 percent understand this, there is
something profoundly wrong when the top 1/10th of 1 percent owns almost as
much wealth as the bottom 90 percent, and when 99 percent of all new income
goes to the top 1 percent.”
With this opening proclamation Sanders soon found himself moving fast
through a primary that previously seemed pre-determined. While Sanders in both
of his runs was unable to secure the primary nomination for the Democratic
71
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Party, he has effectively become much of its spirit and its future much as Barry
Goldwater did for the Republican Party in 1964 or Ronald Regean in the 1976
primary. This has arisen again with the young progressives that dominate much
of the narratives that surround the present Democratic Party with them gaining
both the praise of their supporters and the ire of their enemies both within and
outside of the party. We can also see this in the way that some of the other
candidates spoke during the 2020 Democratic primaries where many of the
issues first raised or brought to prominence by Senator Sanders such as public
healthcare, debt forgiveness, worker’s rights, became mainstream issues that
candidates had to address.72 The present socialist adjacent left populist
movement is still a story in motion that exists in an uncertain space after the
election of President Joe Biden who remains as a largely center-leaning politician
within his party and the United States in general. While some progress has been
made, there is an anxiety present about the movement that hopes to overcome
the old guard of politics in the United States to address issues such as climate
change that dangerously hang over all of us and for whom it seems that our time
to address is slowly running out. Within the minds of Millennials and Generation
Z it continues to exist as the primary counterweight to its rival in the form of the
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facist adjacent alt-right that has risen to prominence throughout the globe over
the course of the past decade with the end result still undecided.
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Chapter NINE
‘THE PEOPLE’ AND THE MARGINALIZED
‘The People’ As An Exclusive Entity
In this discussion it would also be remiss to not closely examine some of the
innate implications that are attached to the idea of ‘the people’ along with the
undue assumptions that should not go unchallenged. As Anderson alludes to, it
is rare to create communities that are utterly all encompassing and that is also
the case here as we see the understood implicit limitations of ‘the people’ as an
expression.73 While given the present discourse we might suggest that it is
understood that the opposition is some sort of ‘elite’ in nature that opposes the
will of ‘the people’. While this is often true, it is not necessarily the case that the
opposition is necessarily a privileged class depending on who and how the
terminology is being used which again reflects our earlier discussion relating to
the role of proxies within populism. This is invoked when certain politicians within
the United States present the idea of the ‘real American’ which in this instance is
often understood to mean white conservative southerners and midwesterners or
perhaps citizens of rural areas as political stratification by territory increases.
When conservative pundits and politicans speak about the dangers of
undocumented immigrants within the United States it is explicitly understood that
they are not considered apart of ‘the people’ while also not existing as a
privileged class like the wealthy might. This is reinforced in this poll conducted by
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Grinnell College concerning who people thought were worthy of immigrating into
the United States with some notable discrepancies that illustrate how a
population imagines itself.74

Figure 6. Immigration Polling

Throughout the 19th century leading into and following the Civil War the
face of the United States was progressively changing. From countries like
Sweden and Ireland there were massive movements of people moving to the
United States often hoping to escape the famines and other assorted issues from
home. While the United States in some ways has positioned itself as the refuge
of the immigrant this is more of a hopeful imagining than anything demonstrably
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presented for much of its history. Waves of immigrants have largely faced both
subtle and overt discrimnation both personally and systemically since the
inception of the country. Several points of interest are to be found in this chart
from the United States Census of the decades before and during the rise of the
Know Nothings.75

Figure 7. Mid-19th Century United States Census Data

The column of the first number shows the total number of recorded
immigrants to the United States during this twenty year period while the latter
denotes how many of them were from European countries. While there certainly
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was immigration from elsewhere it appears that these are largely outliers with the
primary source of immigration being from various European nations. This
demonstrates an interesting dichotomy in the history of nativism that shows both
the changing nature of both the people but also of whiteness and who is allowed
into the power structures of hegemony in a way that we do not see in the same
manner today. The broader history of this sentiment dates back to early
observations made by figures such as Benjamin Franklin who said about the
Germans that they“can no more adopt our ways than they can adopt our
complexion.”76 Over a hundred and fifty years later this prejudice was still
maintained against Irish, Italian, and Hungarian immigrants that were often given
the middle ground categorization of ‘dark white’ to denote their position between
whiteness and blackness.77
Nativism As A Driving Populist Force
A factor in this at the time as noted by Tyler Anbinder in his work on the
subject is the distinctly anti-Catholic bent of the negative response to immigrants
coming into the country at the time. Such sentiment would not go away anytime
soon with the Klu Klux Klan holding heavy anti-Catholic beliefs amongst their
various prejudices. There existed a degree of economic factors in both the
creation of Know Nothings and the nativist ideology in general which is not
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particularly different from what we might find today though it should be noted that
as with today it is only a small part of the equation. Some citizens generally
believed that the new immigrants coming into the United States were willing to
work for lower wages than people born in the United States thus driving down the
value of labor in the area primarily in and around the cities of the nation. This was
accompanied by various protectionist policies and oaths by organizations to not
purchase the goods or services produced by immigrants though how widespread
this was and how seriously it was adhered to remain in serious doubt.78
Even before a relatively organized response from reactionary parties there
existed some rising tendencies among the nativists to this increase in migrants.
In Anbinder’s work we can find earlier efforts at political organizing surrounding
the disenfranchisement of the rights of immigrants throughout the 1840’s which
would eventually result in clashes with these new populaces including riots that
lasted for days. They would be temporarily rebuffed after various political defeats
across the country but this would not stall them for long as a new political
happening would dramatically shake up the landscape of the nation at the turn of
the 1850’s. The Whig party began to fall apart and with that there were new
opportunities for nativists to refocus the sentiments around the nation towards
resentments towards the new immigrants which up until this point were largely
unfocused and were only able to last for a limited time.79
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The result of this would be one of the driving factors behind perhaps the
first prominent third party in the United States. The Know Nothings were an
association of nativist populists whose rhetoric was at times predictably
simple-minded while also being surprisingly prophetic on rare occasions in its
foretelling of future movements.80 The broader expressed sentiments of the
association are laid bare within the publications of the Know Nothings as
demonstrated by this political cartoon.81

Figure 8. Know Nothing's Political Cartoon
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This reveals in the purest terms the striking xenophobia that
defined the Know-Nothings where similar movements now are generally more
subtle by implementing various dogwhistles. The Know-Nothings themselves
would eventually collapse with the ascension of the Republican Party but this
particularly ignorant brand of populism has come to define much of what we
imagine when we conjure the notion of populists now.
As previously alluded to, all too often populism within the United States is
strictly positioned around White men in discussions which is challenged by
authors such as Omar Ali who demonstrates that these traditional narratives
often involve erasure of these efforts. These organizations both found
themselves allied with the People's Party of the United States while also pursuing
their own goals separately from the party as they attempted to build popular
infrastructure in the wake of Reconstruction throughout the region. Given the
ways in which black populations were largely excluded from traditional bases of
power within the United States following the end of Reconstruction in 1876 it is of
short surprise that grassroot efforts would prove so popular. If we are to conclude
as we might that the political processes within the United States in general were
largely favorable to establishing policies and directives for the benefits of white
people then the reaction that we would start to see starting in the South
particularly would seem inevitable.82
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Starting in the early 1880’s we would start seeing some of the first
rumblings of this as African American politicians attempted to challenge the
regional hegemony of the Democratic Party who often operated hand in hand
with terrorist organizations like the Klu Klux Klan in order to maintain their rule via
violence in one form or another. Many of these individuals may have also been a
part of the Republican Party which elected several black senators and
congressmen during the decade or so following the Civil War due to the newly
enfranchised freemen. This violence resulted in attacks across the United States
as many of them attempted to forge alliance with the now obscure previously
noted Greenback Party that was built around various economic reforms during
the era. For these white Democrats no fear loomed larger in their collective
consciousness more than a repeat of Black Republicans obtaining power again
and they would use both state power along with impromptu militias to reinforce
their power. This is particularly notable in Mississippi where corruption was wildly
prevalent among the Democratic Party whose claims were reinforced with the
threat of violence elsewhere in the state. This new organizing would culminate in
the creation of the Colored Alliance which took inspiration from prior
organizations such as the Knights of Labor in its design which often were
required to act in secrecy. Eventually they would by their count amass a
membership of over one million members though contemporary historians
disagree on the specifics of this matter. This era of Black populism would
unfortunately be hindered by Southern efforts at disenfranchising African
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Americans during the height of Jim Crow. What would be noted particularly about
this is the strength of the response towards this populist organizing that wasn’t
present to the same degree for movements before and after. It reveals that not all
groups that organize as ‘the people’ are treated equally within our political
spheres and whereas the Know Nothings were allowed to become
accommodated within standing party structures, this same fate would be denied
to the late Black populists.83
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Chapter TEN
POPULISM AND NATIONAL CONTRADICTIONS
Populism and Mythos
As previously alluded to, populism often serves as a way to channel the
dissonance created from democratic systems that often produce seemingly
undemocratic outcomes. As previously noted this is an expression similar to the
Marxist idea that the conflicts created within capitalism “heighten the
contradictions” to the point that citizens will obtain a sense of international class
consciousness. This differs notably though in that populist movements are not
innately connected to a citizens relation to their labor, they are generally based
on a national scale at their largest, and they refer to more ambiguous categories.
By Marxist definitions there can be only one working class but a nation may
share multiple populist movements that constitute different definitions of the
‘people’ as demonstrated by the Sanders and Trump campaigns. This issue did
not go necessarily unnoticed within Marxist thought which developed the concept
of ‘false consciousness’ to describe such a phenomenon where segments of the
working class would divide among lines different from class interests.84
Sometimes these contradictions reveal themselves in glaring ways as events will
occur that seem to defy established national mythologies. This will in turn spawn
movements that seek to either rectify this mistake against the national
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consciousness or attempt to make it a part of a new national narrative that suits
some subsection of ‘the people’ better. These ideas are represented within
movements at the same time such as what we see with Trumpism and the
debate over whether he is a deviation from America’s past or a logical fulfillment
of it.
Both France and the United States also have and continue to wrestle with
this issue abroad with both existing as nations that threw off the yoke of tyrants
only to create their own imperial projects throughout the last several hundred
years. With France this began nearly immediately with the war against Haiti
during Hatian Revolution which eventually would see Haiti free but also stuck
paying debts for some time.85 This would continue in nations like Algeria,
Vietnam, and elsewhere with France still engaging in similar projects with them
only recently pulling out of an extended campaign in Mali.86 The United States
has also managed a foriegn empire since its incursion into the Philippines that
still is ongoing until this day with the last two decades of American foriegn policy
defined by ongoing projects in the Middle East. Further examination on this
matter is beyond the perimeters of this project but their contribution to this
existing national dissonance is not insignificant.
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Boulanger and Dreyfus
The specter of populism had lay dormant within France for sometime after
the failure of the Revolutions of 1848 where a democratic surge washed across
much of Europe where it was subsequently often put down as we shall examine
later in this paper. While France was not without discontent in the years leading
to the Franco-Prussian War it was only with the visceral example of a national
loss that traumatized much of the country that we would see it arise in a new
vicious form. Ironically, the rise of a new unified German state operated primarily
by Prussian aristocrats would have the effect of yet again striking the hornets
nest that was the French populace. With the loss of the territory of
Alsace-Lorraine in the conflict we would see the rise of a new form of reactionary
populism built upon this sense of grievance. Arising quite suddenly to fulfill this
prophecy about fifteen years following the conclusion of the war was General
Georges Ernest Boulanger. Boulanger was a long veteran of various French
conflicts including the Franco-Prussian War where he steadily rose through the
ranks eventually resulting in his greatest political achievement in being made the
Minister of War in 1886 from which he would use the position as a springboard
for his political ambitions.
Boulanger exists as a massive contradiction in populist thought that
nevertheless is quite common. Boulanger was born into a family of aristocrats
and eventually rose to the rank of General and Minister of War and yet there was
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a significant sentiment that he was a champion of ‘the people’ that would upright
France and strike against its enemies that had left it wounded. Boulanger was
presumed among many to be favorable to the republican cause but this could not
possibly be further from the truth as would soon be revealed. As noted in Irvine’s
writing, the opportunity to return to monarchy was not yet seen as a lost cause
among the royalists of France. They would find their champion in the nation's
new popular War Minister who had recently been put into office but popular
perceptions varied much from what they wanted. Boulanger was perhaps as a
measure of his broad popularity viewed as the epitome of republican patriotism
and even had quite a significant following amongst some of the big names of the
French left despite his involvement with the destruction of the Paris Commune
during his military service.87 It is for this reason that Zeev Sternhell argues in his
work that the sort of proto-fascism present in France during this era transcended
the traditional boundaries of left and right wing politics that we might have
understood up until that point in time which again is a recurring trend in this
analysis.88 As with many movements of this sort it would evaporate with the turn
of the 1890s as we would see an all too common sight for collapsing populist
movements. Boulanger would be absent following the January elections of 1889
which saw him elected as the Deputy of Paris after fleeing France for Belgium
following rumors that he would be charged for crimes against the government
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which he managed to evade. While Boulangism was not quite yet dead it had
been struck with a mortal blow that resulted in it withering away throughout the
remainder of the year. Again the Boulangist reveal one of the essential
paradoxes of populism in which these movements are ironically more attached to
their leadership than more traditional political entities that have existing
structures that allow them to survive without direct top down leadership.
Boulanger would die only two years later and his movement would collapse after
briefly being co-opted into the larger French conservsative Royalist movement in
1889 but this new populist nationalism would carry and morph into a darker form
shortly afterwards with the Dreyfus Affair. 89
The grievances raised earlier in the 19th century by Boulanger and the
Revanchists would not merely disappear with his decline. An enemy still existed
somewhere that had to explain the loss of French dignity and the right wing of
French society would find it in an unfortunately common place. Alfred Dreyfus
was a Jewish French artillery officer who was accused of selling secrets to
Germany and convicted of such in 1894 in what at the time was based on
dubious evidence which we now know was utterly false.90 This subject was not
settled over the course of a few months or even a year but rather nearly a
decade as it would come to define much of France's political culture leading into
the years of World War One. This conflict would be fought in the streets, courts,
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and news media of the era which would prove to be in manner revolutionary
within itself. This is most evident in Emile Zola’s defense of Dreyfus in his famous
letter printed in L’Aurore.91

Figure 9. J’ACCUSE

The aforementioned blatant anti-semitism often found in certain populist
screeds was purpetuated by nationalist publications like L’Eclair who claimed that
Dreyfuss’s guilt was being obscured by Jewish ‘elites’. Much of this brand of
populism was also surrounded by an association with the French military as a
source of virtue with France for many of the right populists. At a certain point it
became fairly clear to the involved parties that Dreyfuss was innocent but his
guilt was required at that point by those against him to maintain the cultural
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cache that was afforded to the French military which became a part of the identity
of its supporters. Populism in this manner is as much or perhaps more about
perceptions than it is reality as it becomes necessary to project strength. Years
later Dreyfuss would eventually be pardoned and placed back into the ranks of
the French military but the effects on French society would not dissipate and
would permanently mold its political culture for the years to come.92
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
POPULISM, BACKLASH AND THE AFTERMATH
Memories of the French Revolution and 1848
No political ideology that has any sort of degree of success is without
challenge but the flexible nature of populism has made specific criticisms both
plentiful but also sometimes indistinct. To some degree this might be intentional
as by nature a critique of populism can be difficult without necessarily targeting
the concept of democracy broadly. While these ideas are not equal neither are
they necessarily historically detached from each other as it seems there is often
a general malaise towards the idea of the popular will that often arrives in waves
alongside populism. This was often prevalent in academic circles around the
1950’s through the 1960’s which is where the majority of the dialogue concerning
populism arose until its reexamination throughout much of the previous decade.
This is further reinforced by newspaper op-eds from the last seven or so years
that are largely critical of both populism's goals and causes with some calling for
a society more driven by the perceived deserving credentialed ‘elite’ that have
risen to the top of an alleged meritocracy though these ideas as presented have
notable historical precedence.
It would be relevant to mention that some of the founders wrote in their
accounts their worries about the ways in which ‘the people’ might react to this
new rising democratic sentiment. While the Founding Fathers did largely oppose
the notion of the old styles of feudalism that gave us landed nobles and divine

99

right of kings they were mostly wealthy and often slave owning merchants that
were often primarily concerned with their financial interests. Alexander Hamilton,
one of the primary supporters of the northeastern based federalists, once
referred to the citizens of the United States as a ‘great beast’.93 This contradiction
towards ‘the people’ in general would come to define much of American populism
to come as the ‘people’ were either largely mistrusted by those in power or they
were often a specific crowd of people that did not properly represent a title as
broad as ‘the people’.
Shortly after this time period the backlash to both the revolution in France
and much of the rest of Europe for that matter became a continued topic of
concern amongst various conservative intellectuals like Edmond Burke. In
Femia's work he lays out some of the foundational ideas against populist rhetoric
or even the basics of popular sovereignty. One of the primary ideas perpetuated
by Burke and Hobbes as previously demonstrated is a fundamental
disagreement concerning the nature of human rights as an abstract good. For
Burke the purpose of society was to provide various institutions that would guide
and advise humans who he viewed as ultimately chaotic and fearful into forming
society such that they would not be the ones managing it but rather being
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managed.94 This is present in Burke’s writing when he says in his highly critical
1790 work Reflections on The Revolution in France.95
“By these theorists the right of the people is almost always sophistically
confounded with their power. The body of the community, whenever it can come
to act, can meet with no effectual resistance; but till power and right are the
same, the whole body of them has no right inconsistent with virtue, and
the first of all virtues, prudence. Men have no right to what is not
reasonable and to what is not for their benefit.”
While the French Revolution itself had been a fading memory at this point
more than fifty years after its era, its sentiment still lived on both throughout
France and for that matter Europe in general. This would culminate in a wave of
populist energy during the Revolutions of 1848 and in France in February of that
year that would see the overthrow of the last king of France Louis Philippe who
abdicated the throne and fled the country after having a strong sense of what
happened the last time this occurred. One of the most notable intellectuals
during this time period who would help redefine some of the ways in which we
might understand ‘the people’ in a revolutionary sense is the anarchist
philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon's opinions changed dramatically
during this period of time as he was heavily affected by the revolutions into
adopting what we might regard as a more optimistic stance concerning the
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possibilities of the republic. He argued that the political reforms of the era were a
sort of bandage over the equally if not more important economic reforms that he
deemed necessary.96
Even for those who were in favor of republicanism or larger societal
changes at the time like Marx or Proudhon, there was a degree of skepticism at
the time concerning how much could be realistically expected from the revolution.
The fall of the king was not broadly considered by contemporary thinkers of the
time as a righteous triumph of ‘the people’ as much as it was considered a sort of
farce that would have little foundations behind its success that would surely
collapse quickly. The final tragic consequence of the French Revolution of 1848
and subsequently many of the revolutions across Europe that year was their
ultimately limited nature. Only several months later in November 1848 would
France see yet again the beginning of the end of the New Second Republic with
the crowning of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III to the Presidency of France. This
was followed around three years later with his subsequent coup that would result
in him being elevated to the status of Emperor of France with a reign that would
last all the way up until his rule collapsed following the Franco-Prussian War that
would welcome in the Third Republic and the final end of the French monarchs.97
What this presents to us is both the fleeting nature of populism without
accompanying structure but also the ways in which populism has affected more
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established ideologies such as socialism rather than merely acting as a shallow
imitation.
Clinton and Contemporary French Populism
Hillary Clinton found herself in a complicated position as the wife of
former president Bill Clinton, former Senator from New York and Secretary of
State during the Obama administration. Clinton had already become profoundly
aware of the possibilities of populist politics given her run against Sanders in the
primary but here she encountered the issue that populism within the right wing of
the United States seems to have a significantly greater hold than left populism
does. Over the course of months she encountered the worst aspects of right
populism both personified by Trump himself but also of much of his following.This
resulted in perhaps the most telling speech of her campaign that some contend
helped doom her candidacy in her now infamous “Basket of Deplorables'' speech
where she said the following.98
“...We are living in a volatile political environment. You know, to just be grossly
generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket
of deplorables. Right? The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic
— you name it. And unfortunately there are people like that. And he has lifted
them up. He has given voice to their websites that used to only have 11,000
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people — now how 11 million. He tweets and retweets their offensive hateful
mean-spirited rhetoric. Now, some of those folks — they are irredeemable, but
thankfully they are not America. But the other basket — and I know this because
I see friends from all over America here — I see friends from Florida and Georgia
and South Carolina and Texas — as well as, you know, New York and California
— but that other basket of people are people who feel that the government has
let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares about them,
nobody worries about what happens to their lives and their futures, and they’re
just desperate for change. It doesn’t really even matter where it comes from.
They don’t buy everything he says, but he seems to hold out some hope that
their lives will be different. They won’t wake up and see their jobs disappear, lose
a kid to heroin, feel like they’re in a dead-end. Those are people we have to
understand and empathize with as well.”
While many would argue that some of her sentiments have a ringing
degree of truth about them concerning the hateful words and actions that
surround much of right wing populism, there is a sense that it was a taboo to
directly say it. It was likely not that she didn’t add a sense of empathy to the
speech necessarily but that much of it was perceived as yet another ‘elite’
scolding much of the nation yet again. The speech is perhaps one of most
defining anti-populist political statements in American history so far as it directly
addressed both the broader ideology and its followers.

104

France in recent years has seen its own surge in populist momentum
during and following the presidency of Francois Hollande. Hollande, while
ostensibly a socialist often broke from left wing policy on an assortment of issues
including foriegn policy which drew detractors from the left. His administration
was in power during a series of terrorist attacks that occured around France
including the Charlie Hebdo attacks of 2015 and the attack at the Eagles of
Death Metal concert that occurred later the same year.99,100 While these issues
were not necessarily his fault and polling suggests that it actually boosted him
slightly, it would not be enough to convince him to run again.101 ‘The people’ of
France went looking elsewhere for leadership and they would find it in an election
that would signify the conflict between populism and neoliberalism in a similar
manner to the United States in 2016.
The dominant figure of this new populism was the perennial right wing
leader Marine Le Pen who is presently the acting President of her party the
National Rally. Le Pen’s history with right wing populism goes beyond herself and
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extends back through her family with her father Jean-Marie Le Pen having been
the leader of the party back when it was still called the National Front.102 Despite
the perceived failings of the previous socialist leader of France, the left was not
without their own candidate in the run up to the election in the form of Jean-Luc
Melenchon. Melenchon has his own complicated history with the political parties
and groups of French left-wing politics that ultimately resulted in the creation of
his political group called the La France Insoumise Group that he was the leader
of up until just recently.103 Finally we arrive at the current president of France who
arguably arrived as a conceivable safe consensus vote against the possibility of
Marine Le Pen in the form Emmanuel Macron. Macron himself is not without his
own various eccentricities but much of his political appeal as a centrist figure in
French politics lies in perhaps his perceived ability to succeed in at least some
manner against the rising tide of French populism that we find yet again. The
populism of modern France has an extensive deal of continuity with its past just
as American politics does but it is also yet again distinctly timely in its specific
nature.
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Much of French opinion is still largely biased against the neoliberal politics
of deregulation and austerity that has had unpopular consequences over the last
several decades that contributed to the rumblings at the beginning of the
previous decade.104 There is a deep skepticism of globalization that is sometimes
an expression of xenophobia but this draws towards deeper conclusions that are
more complicated. Within similar sentiments like Brexit in the United Kingdoms,
there is a sense that the results of international capitalism have not been
favorable for the majority of people in many of these countries.105 While this
sentiment might rarely be specifically declared by these opponents of
globalization in this matter, we can see similar language if we try. This position is
not exclusive to the nationalist populist right in these nations like France either,
there certainly also exists a degree of skepticism both concerning global
capitalism and decrees by the United Nations and the European Union on the left
as well. This is not to say that much of the response has not been the effect of a
sort of returning nativist insurgence from these countries. France in particular
suffers from a high degree of prejudice concerning from its Muslim population
where it regards both recent migrants and second generation citizens with
suspicion. France in this way actually shares its own sort of ‘real american’
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sentiment that we alluded to earlier that concerned itself with placing ‘the people’
of the South and Midwest against those living in coastal states. For France there
is a sentiment about what is French by nature and there is a strong backlash
against deviations from this perceived ‘frenchness’ among its citizens. Much of
this comes with any talk about the identity politics of France that seek to
deconstruct the nature of ‘frenchness’ which sometimes acts similarly to the
American idea of the melting pot where cultures meet to amass into a uniform
culture and ideology.106 In spite of these factors Macron was able to secure a
solid victory in the election of 2017 with a clear victory with 66.1% of the vote but
as we shall note later this is still a developing matter.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
POPULISM AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
Populism and Early Media
When talking about populism as a major force in world history it would be
remiss to ignore the effect it has had upon our media and the way that our media
has in turn often propagated it. Despite the common concerns both legitimate
and questionable regarding the influence of ‘elite’ institutions upon mass media,
we can examine the ways in which new forms of communication have always
played a major role in distributing populist thought. Sometimes these new forms
of media can subvert established power structures by allowing non-traditional
perspectives to break through into the popular imagination in ways that would
have been simply impossible otherwise. It was the advent of the printing press
that would help break the grip that the Catholic church held upon Europe leading
into the Protestant Reformation and while comparisons to that level of change
might be difficult they are still certainly significant within themselves.107
While the advent of relatively modern newspapers in the 17th century
would expand the reach of information for much of the populace, it would not be
until the 19th century when it would become fully available with the creation of
penny press papers. This widespread distribution starting in New York throughout
the 1830’s would revolutionize the industry of the next several decades with both
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its reach and content contributing for better and worse to populist movements.
While these cheap new newspapers allowed for the spread of information to
working class people throughout the United States and beyond whereas such
material would previously be beyond their grasp, the material within these papers
often suffered as a result. Many of these papers would regularly focus on the
easy market for salacious or dubious stories that resulted in oddities such as the
Great Moon Hoax of 1835 where papers recorded that a scientist had witnessed
strange creatures on the moon. Some of these papers would lead the way for
modern tabloid media and the dubious new sources that populate social media
websites that are responsible for spreading dangerous amounts of
misinformation in topics ranging from politics to health.108
The radio as a form of communication arrived around the turn of the 20th
century where it lay somewhat dormant in early years as people struggled to
figure out what exactly to do with it. One of the first sections that really took up its
mantle was religious broadcasters who would use it as a platform to deliver
sermons to the populace starting sometime around the 1910’s. This would
revolutionize popular religion and culture with figures like Sister Aimee Semple
Mcpherson and her Foursquare Church. It would not take long for individuals to
realize the power that the radio held to appeal to the populace at large in political
matters and in turn lay the way for demagoguery. The dominant figure in this
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matter would be the Roman Cathloic priest Charles Couglin who would through
the 1930’s provide a mixed populist message in a similar manner to the earlier
Know Nothings which ironically would be known by the slogan Social Justice. He
combined a platform that was critical of American capitalism but was also deeply
anti-semitic and eventually steered almost entirely into open support of fascism
as many feared that his contemporary Long would eventually do. This eventually
led to the suspension of Coughlin's platform by the government who invoked the
Espionage Act of 1917 against him but his stylings would persist later into the
century and beyond.109 Contemporary figures such as Tucker Carlson on Fox
News operate with a similar ostensibly populist ‘national conservative’ platform
that beckons back to much of this sometimes overtly and other times under the
guise of ‘just asking questions’.
Populism in Film
Common American populist themes also appear through the work of one
of America's most prominent filmmakers during the first half of the twentieth
century in the form of Frank Capra. Two of his now biggest films Mr. Smith Goes
to Washington and It’s A Wonderful Life both feature Jimmy Stewart as noble
everyman protagonists who find themselves pitted against men who often
embody the worst aspects of the American system. In Mr Smith Goes to
Washington his character Jefferson Smith is a literal boy scout leader chosen to
replace a dead Senator in an effort to appease the public while blatantly corrupt
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officials work in the background. Smith is tutored in this by his fathers friend who
is also a Senator but who himself is a conflicted politician who has been
corrupted by party bosses who want him to prevent Smith from building a
campsite so that they can perform a plan which will misuse allocated money on a
construction project at the same area that's been already been a part of a bill
they want to pass. This eventually leads to accusations against Smith who
performs a filibuster to prove his innocence after his fathers friend betrays him by
suggesting he is corrupt. Smith is subverted by the political machinations of the
corrupt bosses until he passes out and his fathers friend can tolerate it no further
and tells everyone that Smith was right and about the corrupt scheme that the
leadership was pushing all along.110
It is with this that we revisit perhaps a quintessential populist sentiment
that even with alleged democracies that the popular will is ultimately managed
and subverted by a class of political ‘elites’ operating within exclusive clubs.
While not exclusive to right wing politics in the United States, this is apparent in
proclamations from political leaders and supporters alike to ‘drain the swamp’
which is a call to remove the perceived political corruption from Washington
though in this instance it is both vague and dubious given the nature of much of
its support.
In It’s A Wonderful Life Stewart plays the role of George Bailey who lives
as a small town banker within the town of Bedford Falls. While the movie touches
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on various highly sentimental elements that elevate the values of the common
man and the small town he lives in, the populist element particularly hits its stride
when George Bailey is juxtaposed against the villain of the movie Mr. Potter.
Potter controls much of the town of Bedford Falls and we can see in the
alternate timeline where George is never born that the town changes from the
idyllic small American town to a depicted cesspit that indulges in various vices
that the movie deems poorly. Potter is the epitome of the financial ‘elite’
represented in some brands of populism as an uncaring robber baron that exists
as a parasitic influence upon the town. This comes to a head in the movie when
George under duress is considering transferring ownership of his bank to Mr
Potter who had stolen the money George needed to keep the bank open during
the Depression. George refuses to give Potter control of his bank on principle
which is well communicated to the audience.
The movie concludes as the virtues of George Bailey are reaffirmed as
‘the people’ of Bedford Falls give him the money he needs in order to keep the
bank open which ultimately demonstrates the value of family, community, and
common decency over greed.111 While this message and indeed the film might
not seem particularly remarkable in this matter considering many other films have
had similar messages, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disagreed. In a report
concerning the real or imagined influence of communist thought in Hollywood
films the FBI opined that the film in its portrayal of the virtues of the common man
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versus a greedy banker was perpetuating communist ideology.112 This worry over
economic populism and its potential left wing sympathies would continue to be
relevant in other productions throughout the second Red Scare which would not
entirely end until the late 1950’s.
The final movie for this examination that demonstrates the populist notion
well is 1976’s Network. The film has the famous “I’m mad as hell and I’m not
going to take it anymore” line where the protagonist laments the losses of the
common man due to the encroaching fears of the era. Perhaps a more poignant
scene in the film is provided by a man who represents ‘the elite’ who tells the
increasingly distressed populist commentator Howard Beale that corporations
have effectively transcended the powers of nations and that they can do nothing
about it.113
It is rare that we are presented so thoroughly with such an imposing
example of populism’s antagonist that goes beyond the simplicity of political
cartoons or basic caricatures but it is conveyed well here. The movie itself is
quite pessimistic in nature though this is of little surprise if we consider its
position as a post Watergate film that expresses the understandable cynicism
that surrounds positions of power throughout the country which would eventually
develop into many of the sentiments that we still find to this day.
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Populism in The Era of Social Media
Finally, with the arrival of the internet we have finally achieved a platform
that would allegedly allow for the democratization of speech and access to such
across anyone who wanted to provide it. While this would show some promise it
carried the same issues of the penny press papers with their dubious reliability
sometimes accidentally but oftentimes more on purpose. We may imagine the
problems that might result when examining this study that shows where
Americans typically get the majority of their news presently.114

Figure 10. Social Media News Source Polling

As we can see, social media has increasingly become a popular news source for
many Americans though this has shown some decline as perhaps an increasing
114

. Mason Walker and Katerina Eva Matsa, “News Consumption across Social
Media in 2021,” Pew Research Center's Journalism Project (Pew Research
Center, September 20, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-across-s
ocial-media-in-2021/.

115

skepticism is growing about the validity of what they find. This sort of reporting
does allow for citizen journalists to spread information that might be censored by
governments or obscured by private entities but just as often this ability is
abused. This is most readily apparent in the spread of misinformation in both the
elections of 2016 and 2020 along with the ongoing Covid 19 pandemic. What this
has revealed is that the ongoing war against the elite has also turned into one
against credentials and expertise as large amounts of the population have
decided that the experts too are in a cabal with these elites to enforce their will
over the population.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Summary of Thoughts
What we might now conclude about the nature of populism's historic
recent rise in the west during the previous decade is that perhaps it never really
went anywhere to begin with. It is ultimately the byproduct of the inequities
produced by liberal capitalist democracies that are not able to fulfill the promises
that they advertise. We can look back and see the ebbs and flows of popular
sentiment that has and continues to create these movements that seek to
provide a sense of direction for these seasonal outrages. While some may argue
that populism is a detriment to democracy, from this I can contend that it by its
very nature is an inescapable fact of any system that would place value on the
will of ‘the people’. The creation of overt illiberalism is often the result of the
frustrations of subtle illiberalism where sections of the populace are determined
wisely or not to take drastic action. ‘The people’ no matter where you go whether
it be France, The United States or elsewhere are merely a combination of
citizens responding back to the events and movements that drive history with the
information that they have available which unfortunately is all too often blatant
propaganda. This is not to say that these notions are either for good or for ill but
rather that they just are and we continue to live with the consequences of it
regardless.
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Populism shall continue to exist as long as humanity feels that they lack
agency in their lives and that the means of changing that seem distantly out of
their control which is not an unfamiliar feeling perhaps to any of us. This
reckoning that each populist movement must have with itself, ‘the elite’, and the
society it inhabits is ultimately its own but they each speak to broader sentiments
that are a part of a shared legacy dating back to our modern world devised
during the 18th century. This has resulted in both the rise of movements that
reformed our systems just as much as it has created despots that use the
language of democracy and the common man to subvert it. It has created more
equitable societies that recognize the agency of its citizens beyond the crumbs
that are often granted within historical democracies but it has also spread hate
that has resulted in the death and injury of the marginalized.
Populism Looking Forward
As of this writing the state of populism in The United States, France, and
the world in general is in a sort of holding pattern. There has not necessarily
been a retreat from the world's populist movements but at the same time they
lack the immediacy and momentum that they carried throughout the middle of the
previous decade. Perhaps some of this has been a case of people getting what
they asked for and not necessarily being happy with results with them either
going too far or too little. We have witnessed a brief response throughout the
world to some of these trends such as the election of Joe Biden following the
defeat of Donald Trump last year after a relatively close election due to the
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electoral college. Biden as a storied Washington insider whose political career
goes back to the post-Watergate era in American politics seems to have been put
into his position as a counter to the bombastic and divisive stylings of his
predecessor though time will tell if that manages to be enough as he attempts to
wrangle with populism.115 Trump as of this writing shows also indication that he
intends to run again in 2024 with polling regularly suggesting that he would again
sweep the Republican field and run a highly competitive election against Biden
so it would be improper to count out American populism at this time. In France
Emmanuel Macron awaits his second battle with Marine Le Pen in an election
that will more than ever before carry the public's notions about what is acceptably
French and if Macron’s relatively milquetoast centrist politics will be enough
against the forces of reaction.
The consequences of these elections and movements reflect upon
broader trends that exceed the borders of these two nations. While the “Make
America Great Again” oriented Christian nationalism of Donald Trump is distinctly
American in many ways, its style and practices are worryingly adaptable. We can
find demonstrable traces of this sort of boisterous strong-man style nationalist
populism in figures like former Army Captain President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil
that used a sort of almost comedic oafishness to disguise vicious sentiments
against vulnerable groups while using his former military experience to signal to
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extremist organizations116. Further west last year in Peru we saw an election
between right and left populists directly with the election between the economic
left populism of Pedro Castillo and the nationalist populism of Keiko Fujimori
which resembles that of Marine Le Pen in various ways. Fujimori herself is the
daughter of the former fascist dictator of Peru Alberto Fujimori who remains in
prison for various crimes who she had planned to pardon if she was victorious.117
Castillo managed to edge out a victory but is currently experiencing the
difficulties of attempting to rule with a nation as divided as any other which
populism has yet to solve.
Another interesting factor that extends beyond the primary objective of this
document is the ways in which the internet has produced entirely new
communities and ways for populism to arise from. The previously mentioned
development of the internet has allowed for systems of populism that seemingly
have the capacity to potentially cross multiple nations as we have witnessed with
the development of entities such as international white nationalists movements
that spread in the unsavory corners of the internet. It seems to follow that if a
large amount of the population of varying nations believes that the world is
dominated by a cabal of ‘globalist elites’ then it has begun to extend the
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sentiment that we might also see the creation of an international volk.118 This is
already most clearly evident within the realm of the aforementioned Q-Anon
conspiracy and its associated movements which has extended from the United
States to the rest of the world. In this way it might ironically come to resemble
some of the more internationalist ideas present within Marxist thought that left
populism sometimes resembles though obviously this produces its own
problems. A relevant idea within the American context is that Congress
consistently polls terribly and yet few blame the individual from their district. This
increasing focus on international ‘globalists’ allows for populists within a nation
such as Russia to ward attention away from domestic matters and ‘elites’ in order
to focus them on the ’elites’ that exist abroad despite the influence of their home
grown oligarchs. Lest we not be critical enough of ourselves this also occurs
when commentators extend the woes of the United States to be the exclusive
province of foriegn powers like China or Russia rather than evaluating if the
powerful entrenched interests of the United States and its allies might also be
worthy of consideration.
Another avenue of research that extends beyond the measures of this
document but which will likely become important in the coming years and
decades will be the impact of climate change upon populism. The immediate
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consequences of such will be the way in which several parts of the world either
due to heat, water supply, or rising oceans will slowly become effectively
uninhabitable. This seems quite likely to result in a rising surge of populist
nativism as climate immigrants will travel seeking new homes to escape the
difficulties of their nations of origin only to be met with what will likely be
considerable hostility. We already can see this in the manner in which immigrants
that are fleeing from war are treated throughout most western nations while
supplies are plentiful. It seems plausible that this will eventually result in fortress
nations where ‘the people’ again become more defined by origins. 119 We can
already take note of a similar phenomenon with current immigrants in Europe
being treated by nationalist populists as proxy adversaries for the ‘globalists’ who
they believe are attempting to subvert their countries with a foriegn population.
Issues and Solutions
A common element to all of this conjecture is perhaps a general sense of
considerable pessimism that is difficult to dismiss. Populism doesn’t have reason
to arise when things are going well though this has not necessarily stopped it
from doing so before. It is ultimately as much an ideology as it is a general
sentiment that the relations of power are not as they should be without the larger
ideological framework provided within more rigorous political theories such as
Marxism. It is perhaps this same reasoning that makes it sometimes intuitively
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appealing. Populism does not require any literature beyond perhaps a short
pamphlet if even that, it is most effective as propaganda often is with short
powerful phrases and an unambivalent lense in which to process modern
difficulties. This document is ultimately not a condemnation nor an exaltation of
populism but rather an attempt to demystify populism as this foriegn entity that
appears to show up in political processes every so often. Going forward we
largely have two options to take in regard to how to approach populism
depending upon our individual and collective objectives. We can either attempt to
wield or assault populism for various political ends as we continue to make our
way throughout the 21th century. Alternatively we can choose to grapple with the
realities that have led people to populist conclusions and attempt to push forth by
removing the undue influence of entrenched power within our systems so that we
may disperse the catalysts that ultimately produce it. With climate change as an
eminent danger upon all of us, we are at a pivotal point in history where we may
choose to either stay the course and potentially slide into illiberalism or ironically
fulfill populism's role and fulfill the democratic promise that we engaged in so
long ago.
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Time for a Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial
Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 6, 248.
Hair, William Ivy. The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey
P. Long. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996,
323-324.
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
1960, 70.
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970.
Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975,
106.
Hobbes, Thomas, and Gaskin J C A. Leviathan (Oxford World's Classics).
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, xviii.
Irvine, William D. The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered: Royalism,
Boulangism and the Origins of the Radical Right in France. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989, 73, 83, 125, 153, 155.
It's a Wonderful Life. Liberty Films, 1946.

130

“Jair Bolsonaro Denies He Is a Fascist and Paints Himself as a Brazilian
Churchill.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 30,
2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/30/jair-bolsonaro-denies
-he-is-a-fascist-brazilian-churchill.
Johnson, Douglas. “Obituary: Pierre Poujade.” The Guardian. Guardian
News and Media, August 28, 2003.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/28/guardianobituaries1.
Johnson, Jenna, and Karen Tumulty. “Trump Cites Andrew Jackson as His
Hero - and a Reflection of Himself.” The Washington Post. WP
Company, March 15, 2017.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-cites-andrew-jackson
-as-his-hero--and-a-reflection-of-himself/2017/03/15/4da8dc8c-099511e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.html.
Klein, Ezra. “Joe Biden's Promise: A Return to Normalcy.” Vox. Vox, May
20, 2019.
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/20/18631452/joe-bide
n-2020-presidential-announcement-speech.

131

Leigh, Andrew. “How Populism Imperils the Planet.” The MIT Press Reader,
November 15, 2021.
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/how-populism-imperils-the-planet.
Leuchtenburg, William E. “FDR and the Kingfish.” AMERICAN HERITAGE,
April 1, 2022. https://www.americanheritage.com/fdr-and-kingfish.
Lewis, Sinclair. It Can't Happen Here. UK: Penguin Classics, 2017.

Long, Huey, and Castro Carazo. “Every Man a King.” Every Man a King |
Tulane University Digital Library.
https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane%3A19147.
“Marine Le Pen Rebrands Front National in Push for Support.” The
Guardian. Guardian News and Media, June 1, 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/01/marine-le-pen-rebran
ds-front-national-in-push-for-support.
Martin, Jonathan, and Sydney Ember. “Bernie Sanders-Style Politics Are
Defining 2020 Race, Unnerving Moderates.” The New York Times.
The New York Times, March 9, 2019.

132

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/us/politics/bernie-sanders-2020
-election-democrats.html.
Mayer, Arno J. The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Rusian
Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, 344,
538, 586.
Moffitt, Benjamin. Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and
Representation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017,
51-52, 54-56, 59, 133, 149-150.
Moggach, Douglas, and Gareth Stedman Jones. The 1848 Revolutions and
European Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2018, 70-79.
Morelock, Jeremiah. Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism. London:
University of Westminster Press, 2018, xiv, 6, 12, 38, 137.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Kaltwasser. Populism a Very Short Introduction.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 1, 5-6.
Müller Jan-Werner. What Is Populism? Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
Network. United States: United Artists, 1976.

133

Onishi, Norimitsu, Ruth Maclean, and Aurelien Breeden. “France
Announces Troop Withdrawal from Mali after 9-Year Campaign.” The
New York Times. The New York Times, February 17, 2022.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/17/world/africa/mali-france-withdra
wal.html.
Onishi, Norimitsu. “Will American Ideas Tear France Apart? Some of Its
Leaders Think So.” The New York Times. The New York Times,
February 9, 2021.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/world/europe/france-threat-ame
rican-universities.html.
Onishi, Norimitsu. “Will American Ideas Tear France Apart? Some of Its
Leaders Think So.” The New York Times. The New York Times,
February 9, 2021.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/09/world/europe/france-threat-ame
rican-universities.html.
Paine, Thomas, and Mark Philp. Rights of Man: Common Sense ; and Other
Political Writings (. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 9, 11, 21.
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